Changes in the organization of production and the skill composition of employment by Loveman, G. (Gary)
CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION
AND
THE SKILL COMPOSITION OF EMPLOYMENT
by
GARY WILLIAM LOVEMAN
B.A., Economics
Wesleyan University (1982)
Submitted to the Department of Economics
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
September 1989
(Gary William Loveman, 1989. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to
distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author
Certified by
Accepted by
Department of Economics
September, 1989
/Professor Michael J. Piore
Thesis Supervisor
Peter Temin, Chairman
Department Graduate Committee
MAsa&MTcu mWMSU
OF TFrre,'-. yiV
OCT 10 1989
LIRARIES
CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION
AND
THE SKILL COMPOSITION OF EMPLOYMENT
by
GARY WILLIAM LOVEMAN
Submitted to the Department of Economics on July 5, 1989
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Ecoinomics
ABSTRACT
This thesis tests for a shift in the organization of production
from mass to flexible production using data on the skill composition of
manufacturing employment. Mass production involves high volume output of
standardized goods using highly specialized, dedicated capital equipment
and a division of labor that seeks efficiency by reducing to the bare
minimum the number of tasks performed by each worker. Flexible
production, on the other hand, refers to the production of specialized, or
customized products made in small quantities using flexible capital
equipment and workers who can quickly be productive at a wide and varying
range of tasks. The much more demanding nature of the task structure for
production workers in flexible production increases the importance of
training costs relative to wages. Since skilled--more highly educated--
workers are likely to be less costly to train, the shift to flexible
production precipitates a relative shift in demand toward skilled workers.
The testable implication of a shift to flexible production is, therefore,
an increase in the employment share of skilled production workers in total
manufacturing production employment. The results support the hypothesis
that there has been a shift since the early 1970s from mass to flexible
production in both the U.S. and western Europe.
The thesis is organized in four chapters. Chapter one begins with
qualitative evidence which illustrates the implications of changes in the
organization of production for the learning and skill requirements of
workers. Next, a formal model is developed in which the firm varies its
employment mix between skilled and unskilled workers as a function of
relative wages, training costs and the length of product life-cycles. The
model yields labor demand functions by skill groups which are used to test
for a shift from mass to flexible production.
Chapter two contains the empirical tests of the model for the U.S.
Data on employment composition by detailed occupation for the period 1977
to 1986 are presented which show a significant increase in the share of
skilled production workers. Relative wage data show no decline for
skilled workers. These facts, together, imply a shift in relative labor
demand. Nonetheless, formal labor demand estimation follows using annual
Current Population Survey data on manufacturing production workers for
1973 to 1985. The estimates demonstrate a shift in demand favoring
skilled at the expense of less skilled workers.
While the shift to skilled workers is derived as a test of
competing production modes, the fact that such an up-skilling has taken
place, both in the U.S. and elsewhere, is an important finding in its own
right. The unskilled have suffered significant relative wage and
employment losses in recent years. Change in the organization of
production is a promising explanation for these losses that transcend
national boundaries.
Chapter three explores our model in the context of two countries
with very different institutional structures: Germany and the United
Kingdom. The first part contrasts the vocational training systems in
Ger-nany and the U.K. and makes predictions, on the basis of our model, of
te implications for the skill composition of manufacturing production
employment in the two countries. The second part presents employment
share and relative wage data from Germany and the U.K. which confirm the
central predictions that: flexible production has for decades been used
more in Germany than in the U.K. or the US; the poor quality of vocational
training in the U.K., coupled with the use of strict craft job
demarcations, forestalled a shift to flexible production until recently;
and, there has been a shift in relative labor demand favoring more highly
skilled production workers in both Germany and the U.K. in recent years.
Chapter four generates further testable implications of flexible
production using non-labor data. The first section considers increases in
intraindustry trade (IIT) as a proxy for shortened product life-cycles.
A ranking of two-digit industries on the basis of change in IIT is shown
to correspond closely to a ranking of industries based on the extent of
the relative shift to skilled production workers. The next section draws
on recent theoretical work in which firms respond to uncertain product
demand by either mass producing and using finished goods inventories to
smooth production, or building to order (produce flexibly) to meet demand
as it is realized. The ratio of order backlogs to finished goods
inventories should rise if firms move from mass to flexible production.
This prediction is confirmed for the period 1970 to 1987 using firm-level
data from Compustat. These results support the shift to flexible
production as the cause of the observed changes in labor demand.
The last section of Chapter examines competing explanations for
the shift in relative labor demand. Secular technological change, and the
outsourcing of low skilled jobs abroad are both considered and found not
to be important causes of the observed changes. Recent shifts in relative
labor demand arising from capital-skill comnlementaries associated with
new, information-intensive technologies is a more likely alternative.
However, the evidence suggests that new technologies have been important
enablers to changes stimulated by product market conditions.
Chapter five recapitulates the main points of the thesis, and
offers lessons for methodology and some broad policy recommendations on
the subjects of assistance for unskilled workers and improvements in the
U.S. vocational training system.
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INTRODUCTION
The past twenty years have witnessed a remarkable reconfiguration
of the international industrial landscape, with countries such as Japan
and Germany prospering while the relative positions of the United States
and the United Kingdom have declined substantially. The onslaught of
vigorous international competition in the U.S. markets for durable goods
forced American managers and scholars to consider alternative
organizatio(nal and managerial methods, and, more broadly, different
institutional structures governing relationships between education, labor,
business and government. Many books have been devoted to diagnosing the
failures in American industry, or the superiorities in Japanese or German
industry. A recent example is Made in America, the report of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Productivity Commission. Neither
this study, nor its predecessors,1 lays blame at the door of American
technology. Rather, these reports fault American managerial practice and
American training institutions. Made in America, for example, argues:
The causes of [the productivity] problem go well beyond
macroeconomic explanations ... to the attitudinal and
organizational weaknesses that pervade America's production
system. These weaknesses are deeply rooted. They affect the
way people and organizations interact with one another and
with new technology; ... and they affect the way business,
government, and educational institutions go about the task of
developing the nation's most precious asset, its human
resources. (p. 166)
In other words, the failure of the organization of production to change
sufficiently in response to changes in the economic environment, and the
failure of the American training system to provide an adequately trained
1See, for example, the Cuomo Commission Report (1988).
workforce, lies at the heart of this country's competitive shortcomings.
The economics profession has not been enormously helpful in
understanding differences in the organization of production across
countries or firms. This is due in part to a preference for tractable
mathematical models. However, it is largely the result of the stability
of the mass production organizational structure, and the institutions that
surrounded it, from the Great Depression to the early 1970s. In the midst
of such stability, economists modelled a firm's reactions to changes in
relative prices, demand shocks and the like, assuming no fundamental
changes in firm behavior or in the organization of production.
Piore and Sabel (1984) were the first to identify the reliance of
the existing American institutional structure on mass production, and to
articulate the relationships between mass production and the central
pillars of the American institutional structure; e.g. industrial unionism,
macroeconomic stabilization policy, and educational institutions. Their
work called into question the stability of mass production, and suggested
that an alternative organization of production, flexible specialization,
may be better suited to the more turbulent, internationalized economic
environment of the 1980s.
Mass production involves high volume output of standardized goods
using highly specialized, dedicated capital equipment and a division of
labor that seeks efficiency by reducing to the bare minimum the number of
tasks performed by each worker. Flexible specialization, on the other
hand, refers to the production of specialized, or customized, products
made in small quantities using flexible capital equipment and workers who
can adapt to perform a wide variety of tasks. It is, in other words, a
return to craft, or artisanal methods of production. Piore and Sabel
describe in detail the historical antecedents of mass production and
flexible specialization, and discuss the fundamental differences that
distinguish the two ways of organizing production. Apart from anecdotal
evidence, however, they do not provide empirical evidence for the extent
to which there has been a shift in American manufacturing from mass
production to flexible specialization. 2 Indeed, Piore and Sabel view the
outcome of America's crisis in institutional structure to be unresolved:
they argue that firms and societies must choose between mass production
and flexible specialization. Furthermore, they argue that technology will
not be the deciding factor: it can be used to support either scheme.3
Mass production and flexible specialization are polar cases defined
by large volume output of a single good and low volume output of a
potentially infinite number of goods, respectively. In the interior lies
20ne important implication of the Piore and Sabel story that has been
subjected to empirical scrutiny is that flexible specialization reduces
any competitive disadvantages resulting from small size. Results from a
recent international study (Sengenberger and Loveman, 1988) confirm that,
after decades of a trend away from small establishments, there has since
the late 1970s been a reversal of this trend. In each of the ten
countries studied, the employment shares of small (less than 100
employees) establishments have risen since the late 1970s. There is also
evidence of substantial downsizing among the establishments of large
nterprises.
The issue of technology's role in the story is considered in detail
below.
the more common cases, described by Piore (1987) as mass production with
cosmetic variation and flexible mass production. The former refers to
changes in independent features of the product such as color or
accessories. As such, it involves no major changes in the organization of
production. Flexible mass production, on the other hand, refers to the
capacity to produce a large, but finite, number of distinct products. It
is the ability to produce many distinct products that requires a
fundamentally different organization of production. Throughout the
remainder of this thesis the term "flexible production" will be used to
describe those cases where at least several distinct products can be
produced. It, therefore, spans from Piore's flexible mass production to
flexible specialization. "Mass production" will be used to describe the
output of a single product, with or without cosmetic variation. These two
more general terms are used because they capture with sufficient precision
the fundamental differences in the organization of production that are at
issue in this thesis, without unwieldly detail.
The empirical question of whether or not America is undergoing a
shift toward flexible production is critical, since flexible production
may require a very different institutional structure, and may inflict at
least transitory costs on particular groups. Furthermore, if flexible
production indeed enhances America's competitive position in the world,
impediments to the adaptation to flexible production may be costly to our
standard of living.
This thesis is an attempt to articulate a central testable
implication of a shift from mass to flexible production, and to test the
implication both in the U.S., and in Western Europe using a comparative
methodology. The testable implication stems from an alternative theory of
employment determination premised on the notion that the way in which
firms go about maximizing profits has important implications for the labor
market outcomes of different groups of workers. In this theory, firms
make strategic choices about how to respond to changes in product markets,
and these choices in turn influence their hiring decisions. Particular
strategies may bode well, or poorly, for specific groups of workers. If
there has been a pervasive shift in strategy that is disfavorable to
particular groups of workers, these workers will have difficulty finding
employment.
Flexible production, we contend, requires adaptable workers who can
quickly be productive at a wide and varying range of tasks. The training
component of employment cost therefore rises relative to wages as the
frequency and amount of training increases, and ceteris paribus firms'
labor demand shifts toward workers for whom training is least costly.
Since skilled--more highly educated--workers are likely to be less costly
to train, the shift to flexible production precipitates a relative shift
in demand toward skilled workers. The result is a deterioration in the
employment prospects for unskilled workers.
The testable implication of a shift to flexible production is,
therefore, an increase in the employment share of skilled production
workers in total manufacturing production employment. The focus is on
production workers because it is in this employment group that a change in
the nature of production should be most evident. Up-skilling among other
groups, such as white-collar jobs replacing blue-collar jobs, is
consistent both with a shift in the organization of production and
traditional stories such as technological change and capital-skill
complementarity. To the extent that employment and training institutions
vary across countries, the direction of the shift to skilled workers will
remain, but the details may vary significantly. In countries such as
Germany, where the institutional structure has historically been better
suited to flexible production, the timing and magnitude of the shift may
be very different from, say, the U.K. and the U.S.
While the shift to skilled workers is derived as a test of
competing production modes, the fact that such an up-skilling in
production employment has taken place, both in the U.S. and elsewhere, is
an important finding in its own right. The deteriorating employment
prospects of less skilled workers is currently an important policy
concern, in at least two respects. First, among the most perplexing facts
associated with the sharp rise in unemployment in Europe has been the
inability of the unemployed--particularly the long-term unemployed--to
find work despite upturns in output and wage demands well within the
bounds allowed by productivity growth.4 What is perhaps less widely
4$ee Bentolila (1988) for evidence on these stylized facts.
recognized is that the incidence of unemployment has fallen
disproportionately on unskilled workers, while there are often shortages
of skilled workers.5 Similarly, Murphy and Topel (1987) have shown that
long-term unemployment in the U.S. has increasingly fallen on male
production workers with stable work experiences who heretofore were rarely
found in long-term unemployment.
Two implicit assumptions underlying the work on unemployment 6 are
that firms are going about doing what they have always been doing--
maximizing profits--and the only changes in their behavior result from
changes in constraints, relative prices and demand shocks; and, that
workers are sufficiently homogeneous as to be considered one aggregate
input. This thesis provides an alternative framework in which firms do
not wish to hire low skilled workers, even at very moderate wages.
Second, there has been considerable research recently, discussed in
detail below, which documents a severe decline since 1979 in the relative
wages of less skilled workers in the U.S. This decline reverses a long-
standing trend in the other direction, and is particularly notable given
the significant increase in the relative supply of more highly educated
workers. The research on changes in the wage structure, too, explores a
variety of explanations premised on organizational stability within firms.
The current state of that research suggests that change in the
organization of production is a promising explanation for the unexplained
5See Blanchard (1988).
6See Bentolila and Bertola (1988) and Blanchard and Summers (1986) for the
state of the art in this field of research.
within-industry relative wage and employment losses suffered by the less
skilled. Furthermore, the findings of this thesis show that the
employment prospects for unskilled workers have deteriorated for reasons
that transcend national boundaries, which further indicates the need for
explanations that are not idiosyncratic to the U.S.
The thesis is organized in four chapters. Chapter one develops
the qualitative story and formal model of changes in the organization of
production that underlies the remainder of the thesis. It begins with a
brief review of the Piore and Sabel (1984) characterization of mass
production and flexible specialization. Several case studies are then
discussed which illustrate the implications of changes in the organization
of production for the learning and skill requirements of workers. These
case studies provide a detailed view of work on the shop floor that makes
concrete the increased range of tasks that are involved in flexible
production.
The first Chapter concludes with the presentation of a formal model
of firm behavior. The firm hires two kinds of workers, skilled and
unskilled. These workers must be retrained each time a new product is
introduced, and the training costs are lower for the skilled workers. The
firm varies its mix of employment as a function of relative wages,
relative training costs and the length of the product life-cycle.
Differences in employment and training institutions across countries
influence the skill mix of employment via the relative cost and supply of
skilled workers. The model yields labor demand functions by skill group
which are used to test the central hypothesis that a shift from mass to
flexible production results in an increase in the relative demand for
skilled production workers. Finally, model simulations are presented to
examine the behavior of relative wages and employment shares when firms
move from mass to flexible production.
Chapter two contains the empirical tests of the model for the U.S.
It begins by presenting what little data are available on product life-
cycles. Data on employment composition by detailed occupation are then
used to construct three skill groups for durables manufacturing production
workers over the period 1977 to 1986. The data show a significant
increase in the share of skilled workers. Relative wage data for similar
groups show no decline in the relative wages of skilled workers. These
facts, together, imply a shift in relative labor demand. Nonetheless,
formal labor demand estimation follows using annual Current Population
Survey data on manufacturing production workers for 1973 to 1985. Since
panel data on product life-cycles do not exist, a simple time trend is
used to proxy for reductions in the length of product life-cycles over the
period. The estimates demonstrate a shift in demand favoring skilled at
the expense of less skilled workers. The results are robust to a variety
of specifications and estimation techniques. Since the share of total
production employment has declined as that of professional and technical
workers has risen, the employment prospects of unskilled production
workers have deteriorated severely.
The last section of Chapter two reviews previous work on labor
demand by skill group, and discusses the empirical results in the context
of research on changes in the relative wage structure in the U.S. Several
authors have found a recent sharp rise in the relative wages of more
highly educated workers; e.g., college versus high school graduates.
While this research involves data on workers in all industrial sectors and
focuses on educational rather than occupational groups, the findings of
this thesis address the current missing link in the relative wage
structure literature: an explanation for the within-industry shift in
relative labor demand favoring more highly educated (or skilled) workers.
Chapter three explores our model of changes in the organization of
production in the context of two countries with very different
institutional structures: Germany and the United Kingdom. Training
systems determine the relative cost and supply of different skills in the
labor market, and in our model they, in turn, affect how production is
organized. The first part of this chapter contrasts the vocational
training systems in Germany and the U.K., and makes predictions, on the
basis of our model, of the implications for the skill composition of
manufacturing production employment in the two countries. This
international comparative methodology is a very powerful and underutilized
tool for distinguishing among competing theories. Variance in
institutional structures generates additional testable hypotheses, while
other variables, such as technology, are essentially held constant across
countries.
The second part presents employment share and relative wage data
from Germany and the U.K. The data confirm the central predictions that:
due to its extensive vocational training program, flexible production has
for decades been used more in Germany than in the U.K. or the US; the poor
quality of vocational training in the U.K., coupled with the use of strict
craft job demarcations, forestalled a shift to flexible production until
recently; and, there has been a shift in relative labor demand favoring
more highly skilled production workers in both Germany and the U.K. in
recent years. The final section presents two case studies. The first
illustrates the shift to flexible production in the U.K. motor vehicles
industry, while the second compares the different organization of
production in the machine tool industries of Germany and the U.S.
Chapters one and two present the model and test it using labor
data. However, since product life-cycle data, or other measures of
volatility in product markets are not available, the cause of the observed
shift in labor demand remains open to debate. Chapter three uses
international comparisons to generate unique implications of flexible
production as the source of changes in manufacturing production employment
composition. Chapter four continues in this vein by using non-labor
variables to generate testable implications of flexible production. The
first section considers increases in intraindustry trade as a proxy for
shortened product life-cycles. Intraindustry trade, it is argued, is a
consequence of business strategies based on product differentiation and
flexible production.7 Intraindustry trade indices are calculated for each
two-digit S.I.C. manufacturing industry and a rankingi is made on the basis
of the increase for the period 1974-84 over the period 1958-73. This
ranking is shown to correspond closely to a ranking of industries based on
the extent of the relative shift to skilled production workers. Hence, if
increases in intraindustry trade are a valid proxy for reductions in
product life-cycles, then these results support the shift to flexible
production as the cause of the observed changes in labor demand.
The next section draws on recent theoretical work by Milgrom and
Roberts (1988a,b) that models mass versus flexible production as two means
for responding to uncertainty in product markets. Firms may either mass
produce and use finished goods inventories to smooth production, or build
to order (flexibly) to meet demand as it is realized. Milgrom and Roberts
argue that the ratio of order backlogs to finished goods inventories
should rise if firms move from mass to flexible production. This
prediction is tested for the period 1970 to 1987 using firm-level data
from Compustat. Changes in accounting methods for inventory valuation
complicate the analysis, but the results from a battery of tests indicate
an increase in the ratio of order backlogs to finished goods inventories
after controlling for other variables known to influence inventory
behavior. Rankings of the manufacturing industries on the basis of the
increase in this ratio and the shift to skilled workers yield mixed
7The relationship between this argument and Krugman's (1981) model is
discussed in Chapter four.
results. Nonetheless, the overall results generally support the
hypothesis of a change from mass to flexible production.
The last section examines competing explanations for the shift in
relative labor demand. Long-term increases in the employment share of
skilled workers as a consequence of secular technological change, and the
outsourcing of low skilled jobs abroad for cost-cutting purposes are both
considered and found not to be fundamental causes of the observed changes.
Recent shifts in relative labor demand arising from capital-skill
complementaries associated with new, information-intensive technologies is
a more likely alternative. It is discussed in some detail, with the
conclusion that new technologies have been important enablers to changes
stimulated by product market conditions.
Chapter five recapitulates the main points of the thesis, and
offers lessons for methodology and some broad policy recommendations on
the subjocts of assistance for unskilled workers and improvements in the
U.S. vocational training program.
It is important to point out at the beginning that this thesis
pursues a methodology that is atypical of conventional economics. It
begins by asking a broad question based on case study evidence and
existing research. A formal model is introduced to clarify the discussion
and generate testable implications. However, crucial variables (e.g.
product life-cycles) in the model, and in the more general discussion, are
not observable in large samples. It is this lack of data that forces the
methods that follow. First, a test consistent with the implication of the
model is conducted (i.e. the tests for a shift in relative labor demand).
Second, international comparative analysis is used to bring variance in
institutional structures to bear to generate unique hypotheses that depend
on observable cross-country differences. Third, non-labor implications of
a shift to flexible production are tested to further delineate this from
competing explanations for the shift in relative labor demand. Finally,
the merits of other explanations are considered explicitly.
The objective is to build a mosaic of evidence which can be used to
evaluate the central hypothesis of a change in the organization of
production from mass to flexible production. While it does not have the
flavor of a demonstration that a unique proposition has been proven to the
exclusion of all others, this thesis does provide substantial empirical
evidence on a broad and hopefully important issue that has heretofore not
been subjected to this type of scrutiny.
CHAPTER I
A Model of Changes in the Organization of Production
and the
Demand for Labor by Skill Group
A. Mass Production and Flexible Specialization
The title of Piore and Sabel's (1984) book, The Second Industrial
Divide, refers to a period in which a choice exists between two
"technological trajectories": mass production and flexible specialization.
The first such occasion occurred during the nineteenth century, when
firms in more industrialized countries pursued mass production. 8 The
strategy of large firms was to reduce unit costs via long runs of
standardized products, and collect the rents associated with imperfect
competition in product markets. Stability was critical in this system
because the extensive division of labor and use of inflexible, dedicated
capital equipment, and the reliance on scale economies to generate
profits, made instability in input supply (strikes), output demand, and
prices very costly. For example, large changes in input prices were
8Small firms filled a special, largely subordinate role in this system.
They produced for specialized markets, and the precarious nature of their
business necessitated flexible production; i.e., more general labor and
capital. Indeed, their production was characteristic of craft work:
relatively small capital stocks and relatively many highly skilled craft
workers.
costly because the rigid nature of the production technology did not
permit easy substitution of inputs. Instability in output prices was a
problem insofar as price reductions rendered production unprofitable, and
it was not possible to quickly move into the production of alternative
products. The skill mix of employment in mass production firms reflected
the extensive division of labor, as a very large portion of employment
consisted of semi and unskilled production workers who manned and
supported assembly lines.
The OPEC shock in the early 1970s began a period of institutional
crisis, Piore and Sabel argue, as the existing institutional structure
failed to respond well to a different economic environment. The economic
environment of the 1970s featured a breakdown in stability and growth in
most Western countries, evidenced by sharp and unpredictable changes in
raw materials prices, an increase in international competition in product
markets (especially in markets formerly dominated by a few large
producers), floating exchange rates, very rapid technological change, and
an unexplained slowdown in productivity growth.
The crisis presents an opportunity to choose again between the
alternative technological trajectories. A large and growing international
literature, based largely on case studies, now exists to document that
manufacturing firms are responding to greater international competition,
shorter product life-cycles, rapid changes in factor prices, and a general
increase in uncertainty by pursuing a fundamentally different strategy:
flexible production.9 Rather than seeking to gain market power in markets
for standardized goods, firms are attempting to produce high quality,
innovative and customized products. Rapid development and introduction of
new products in response to market changes is a primary goal, as are
timely delivery and customer service. The objective is to create and
serve product niches that, unlike commodities, are less vulnerable to low
cost competition, particularly from less developed countries. Flexible
production allows producers to respond quickly to changes in demand or
relative prices, thus mitigating the slow adjustment and consequent losses
characteristic of mass production. The following section presents some
case study evidence from large firms that have undergone the
transformation from mass to flexible production.
B. Qualitative Evidence on Flexible Production and Skill Requirements
Evidence on the shift from mass to flexible production, and the
causes of the shift, consists almost entirely of case studies of specific
firms, industries and regions. While no attempt is made here to survey
this literature - Sabel (1988) accomplishes this task in part - the
central theme is that increased product market competition and greater
economic turbulence led firms to favor flexible production. The examples
that follow are used to show how flexible production differs from mass
production, and to identify the characteristics of flexible production
most salient for changes in the skill composition of employment.10
9See Sabel (1988) for a survey, and Locke (1988) and Piore (1987) for
fecific case studies.
'While the focus of this thesis is primarily on the U.S., Italian case
studies are used because of their rich detail on changes in the task
structure and learning requirements for production workers. American
Frederico Butera (1975) describes the shift from a strategy of mass
production to flexible production at Olivetti in the 1970s:
The character of Olivetti's market has changed; it is more
specialized, more differentiated in terms of performance
requirements, more demanding in terms of technical quality, and,
above all, subject to stronger competition. To be successful in
these markets the company must not only offer competitive prices and
very high quality; chiefly, it must also supply a wide range of
products and constantly improve them to meet customers'
requirements. As a consequence, for example, the company's catalog
grows larger, since each product is supplied in an increasing number
of models, and the products' lifetimes are considerably shorter.
(pp. 167-8)
The ramifications for the organization of production and skill
requirements were substantial. Previously, mass production was conducted
using long assembly lines along which each assembly operation was a short,
simple task. Workers had no knowledge of the mechanical function of the
assembled pieces, and were trained only to meet the pace of the line.
Inspection, repair, and supervision were provided by three other groups of
workers.
In the new flexible production regime, the long assembly lines are
being replaced by several subassembly units, each of which produces one
examples may be found in Zuboff (1988) and Hirschhorn (1986). A
comparison of work organization in U.S., Japanese and European textile
mills is made in the textile industry study in Dertouzos, Lester and Solow
(1989).
functional and testable part of the product (e.g., the printer or the
tabulator in a calculator). These parts then go to a very short final
assembly line where they are combined to yield the final product. Thus,
rather than dividing production into many sequential steps, the new
process involves parallel production by several subassembly units. Each
worker is now involved in the production of a mechanical assembly, rather
than just one step, and more importantly, is responsible for inspecting
and repairing his/her own work, acquiring his/her own supplies, and
substituting for absent workers in the production unit. Butera notes:
The worker is trained to know not only the sequence of the assembly
operation he performs but all the functions and mechanical
principles of the subproduct on which he works. The type of
training given to the assembly [worker] is no longer only an
investment for the specific job, but improves the basic professional
education of the worker.... The greater accumulation of basic
knowledge by workers means that it is easier to transfer
personnel, and high mobility has been a major feature in recent
years. (pp. 179-193)
Butera concludes that short product life-cycles reduce the time
available for reorganizing work using a detailed division of labor and
favors production in flexible cells of more generally trained workers.
Locke (1988) discusses Fiat's efforts in the 1980s to increase its
product differentiation by shifting from "a few poorly differentiated
models to many new models with frequent restyling" (p. 3). Like the
Olivetti product, Fiat cars are now made of interchangeable parts that are
assembled along with components particular to each model to produce a wide
range of final products. The modular production system also allows
innovations in each component without overhauls in the model itself.
Locke argues:
By...rediscovering artisanal modes of production and coordination,
car makers are disaggregating their activities into autonomous but
coordinated units specialized in particular aspects of production
along the lines of flexible specialization. Developments like
integrated engineering, decentralized production and the formation
of polyvalent workers are...evidence of this trend. (p. 49)
Finally, Horst Kern and Michael Schumann have been collecting case
study material in West Germany, and have published a volume of these
studies that is, unfortunately, available only in German. However a
recent paper by Kern and Schumann (1988) summarizes the main findings:
Work today has a very different function than it did when
traditional manufacturing processes were used. Human work is no
longer direct: it no longer involves more or less immediate contact
with materials and products. Instead, it encompasses activities
such as planning, regulating and controlling. This kind of work
resists division. In fact it is most efficient when combined with
functions such as upkeep of machinery and inspection of the finished
product. This new, more synthetic approach redefines factory
jobs.... The need for theoretical competence is rather high, too
high at least for on-the-job training. Professional training is
necessary. (p. 15)
This research suggests that flexible production involves the
reorganization of work away from narrow repetitive tasks based on an
extensive division of labor, and toward groups of tasks spanning very
different activities that require a conceptual understanding of the
production process. The next section develops a simple model of firm
behavior in which changes in the length of product life-cycles trigger
changes in the composition of employment, as firms seek workers who are
most efficient at performing a wide and varying range of tasks.
C. A Formal Model
When firms were in the business of mass production, stable products
and production processes permitted the amortization of training costs --
such as were required -- over the very long period during which the
product was being produced. In most cases, mass production involved many
jobs with narrow, highly repetitive tasks requiring little training or
skill. Since the tasks were so narrow and far removed from the rest of
the production process, workers performing these tasks had little by way
of general or formal training, and most workers lacked any "conceptual"
knowledge of the production process. Conceptual knowledge refers to an
understanding of the interdependencies between the various parts of the
production process; an understanding of each step and the mechanisms that
link them. This very general and holistic knowledge of the production
process may be contrasted with the "customary" knowledge of an unskilled
mass production assembly worker, who knows only the task required of him
and lacks any broader knowledge of the overall process.11
When production is less stable--products change rapidly and are
less standardized--it is precisely this conceptual knowledge of production
that is necessary for workers to respond effectively to changing tasks.
When workers are asked to perform a rapidly changing set of tasks, they
must have an understanding of how the tasks can be reconfigured and how
l1 For elaboration on the general distinction between conception and
execution see Piore (1968) and Braverman (1974).
their work fits into the new production process. In the absence of such a
conceptual understanding, the training costs necessary for changes in the
production process would be prohibitive. Furthermore, if flexible
production is enhanced by team work--in particular, team work involving
very different occupations such as engineer and production worker--
conceptual knowledge is vital.1 2 Production workers must communicate
effectively with other team members. If each production worker knows
nothing more than his specific task, then team work is essentially
fruitless.
A conceptual understanding of production may come from formal
training, on-the-job training, or some combination. The cost to the firm
of training a worker sufficiently so as to perform some changing basket of
tasks required by flexible production varies inversely with the level of
training already received by the worker.1 3 The cost is therefore less for
highly skilled workers than for unskilled workers. Since flexible
production involves frequent training in order to adapt to new products
and processes, and since the amortization period is consequently shorter
than in mass production, firms will increasingly favor the employment of
skilled workers at the expense of unskilled workers, for given relative
wages.14
12Furthermore, it behooves firms to have workers actively involved in the
innovation process, and this participation is much more likely to comefom workers who understand the big picture.
It may also be the case that existing training signals higher worker
fility, which acts to further reduce training costs.
Small firms.have always employed relatively more skilled workers and
fewer un and semi-skilled production workers than have large firms,
because small firms have always been more flexible producers. The shift
to flexible production by large firms is now tending to move their
These insights can be captured by a model in which, for simplicity,
the multiple factors that have increased instability in product markets
are represented by an exogenous shortening of the product life-cycle.15
Consider a firm with monopoly power during the life of a product.
Reductions in the length of product life-cycles are, then, the source of
increased volatility in product markets that induces flexible production
(data on product life-cycles are discussed in Chapter II). In this model a
product life-cycle refers to the period over which a firm producing the
product can capture an economic rent. The firm has market power in the
product market and can charge a price greater than marginal cost for a
period of time, after which entry by competitors drives down the price to
marginal cost. This definition is different from the norm, which refers
to the period over which a product is produced, irrespective of rents.
Product life-cycles defined in the former way are a good proxy for product
market volatility because they capture the effects of heightened
competition, regardless of the source of the competition.16
employment mix increasingly toward that of small firms. See Sengenberger
nd Loveman (1988)
51f there has been a shift to flexible production, the ramifications for
the skill composition of employment proposed above are likely to result
irrespective of what caused the shift. Technological change, for example,
may favor flexible production, resulting in a shift toward skilled workers
akin to that resulting from shortened product life-cycles. We focus on
product life-cycles because they are a multi-faceted indicator of
heightened product market competition.
16Entry by domestic firms, import competition, technological change and
innovation all act to shorten the period over which a firm has market
power for a given product.
A stream of products are assumed to be available to the firm;
entry/exit decisions are not modelled explicitly. Each product has a
life-cycle of length qt, where t indexes the products. The firm must
train its workers in order to produce each new product, and this cost is
incurred irrespective of the length of the product life. Labor input is
some basket of tasks, which can be done either by skilled or unskilled
workers. However, the training costs associated with the skilled workers
are less than those associated with unskilled workers (note that these
training costs are not those normally observed, since workers of different
skill levels are typically trained to perform different jobs). The firm
pays the training costs, and takes the worker as he\she arrives at the
door each period. Therefore, international variation in training
institutions will affect the model's outcomes in different countries.
Finally, the model is not one of technology choice: the production
function is stable over time. There are three reasons for pursuing this
approach: first, modelling technology choice is a very involved endeavor,
sufficiently so as to be the focus of a study rather than a detail (see
Fine and Li, 1987); second, if flexible production technology itself
increases the relative demand for skilled workers, as the case study
evidence suggests, then our model will understate the magnitude of the
employment shift by skill level; and third, the empirical work that
follows is sufficiently general to allow a mid-stream change in production
technology.
The problem facing the firm, then, is to choose St and Ut to
maximize:17
qt[Pt(Qt)Qt - Ws*St - Wu*Ut] - ts*S t - tu*Ut  (1)
where Pt(Qt) - price for product t;
Qt - output of product t - f(St,Ut);
ws - wage of skilled worker;
wu - wage of unskilled worker;
St - quantity of skilled workers;
Ut - quantity of unskilled workers.
ts - training costs for skilled workers;
tu - training costs for unskilled workers.
qt multiplies the conventional revenue stream less wage costs but not the
training costs, because the training costs are incurred for each product
irrespective of the length of its life-cycle.
Consider now the first order condition with respect to S for an
arbitrary product t:
qt[P'Qs*Q + P*Qs - w ] - ts - 0 (2)
or
P'Qs*Q + P*Qs " Ws + (1/qt)*ts (2')
An analogous first order condition obtains for Ut. Assuming a Cobb-
Douglas production function and linear product demand, (2) can be written
17This model can easily be extended to include dynamics by making current
period training costs a function of worker tenure with the firm. In this
case firms have an incentive to maintain a stable core of skilled workers,
because turnover is costly in terms of training. While the dynamic model
is more realistic, its implication for the shift in labor demand by skill
group is not fundamentally different from the simpler static model.
Therefore, since the empirical model is also static, we present the static
model here.
explicitly as:
S - ([(a(aTu)P)/2b(PTs)8] - [(Tsl-2P(aTu)2 ) / 2ba92f]) (3a)
U - ([(a(Ts,) ' P) / (2b(aTul, )] - [(1-2.) / (2ba(aTu)1-2i(Ts2P))]) (3b)
where:
Q - sau ;
P - a - bQ;
Ts - (ws + (1/q)ts);
Tu - (wu + (1/q)tu).
The first order condition (2') shows what is different in this
formulation from the standard case. Firms face training costs which grow
in importance as the product life shortens. The shift to skilled labor
results from the increased importance of training costs as q shortens.
The firm now equates the value marginal product with the wage 2lu a
training cost variable that is a function of q. For a given wage vector
and ts < tu, as qt goes to zero the firm shifts increasingly to skilled
workers. This can be seen by first solving for S/U and then
differentiating to find d(S/U) / dq:
S/U - (aTu) / (PTs) (4)
Noting that initially relative wages equate marginal products less
training costs, it is straightforward to show that d(S/U)/dq is negative
so long as ts < tu. Thus, reductions in product life-cycles increase the
share of skilled workers in total production employment. It is important
to emphasize, however, that the shift to skilled workers depends on
reductions in q. If a firm simply shifts from mass production of one
product to mass production of another, perhaps for international trade
purposes, they will continue to use the cheaper unskilled workers to the
greatest extent possible by specializing tasks and amortizing any training
costs over the long period of production of the new product. For
plausible values of q, ts and tu, it is quite possible that the training
cost component rivals the wage in magnitude. It is shown in the following
paragraphs that, barring severe wage reductions by unskilled workers,
employment shifts to skilled workers as q declines.
In a classical economy with fully-equilibrating relative prices,
there need be no shift toward skilled workers so long as the wages of
unskilled workers decline sufficiently. A simulation of the model,
however, shows that the wages of unskilled workers are not likely to fall
enough to maintain their employment share as q declines. To make this
point concrete consider a simulation, based on parameter values from the
data presented in this paper, of the relative wage reductions needed for
unskilled workers to maintain a stable employment share when q declines.
The computer product life-cycle data given in Table 1 (discussed in
Chapter II) suggest that q has declined by at least one-half from the mid-
1960s to the mid-1980s. Therefore, the simulation is a linear decline
from q - 1 to q - .5. Data from the Current Population Survey (Table 6,
also discussed in Chapter II) suggest that the wage ratio for skilled
workers (craftsmen, foremen and kindred workers) versus unskilled workers
(operatives and laborers) was roughly 1.3 in the late-1970s. Suppose that
the higher wage for skilled workers was purely the market's valuation of
differential training costs:
ws 
-
wu + (1/qt)*t u - wu + tu
where, for simplicity, we normalize ts-O and set the initial value of qt -
1. It is straightforward to solve (4) for the values of wu needed to keep
S/U constant as q falls. We impose equilibrium factor shares for S and U
equal to those observed in the late-1970s: .3 and .7, respectively (see
Table 6).18
Chart 1 shows the results of two simulations. The dashed line
shows the simulated value of wu, which falls thirty percent over the ten
periods. Thus, even if the technology is stable, the increased importance
of training costs when product life-cycles are shorter requires
substantial relative wage reductions in order to maintain stable relative
employment of unskilled workers.
If firms respond to a decline in q by altering their production
technology in a way that, ceteris paribus, raises the marginal product of
skilled vis a vis unskilled workers, then the reduction in wu necessary to
keep S/U unchanged is significantly larger (it was shown in Section B
18Note that since we have assumed ws - wu + tu, the wages inclusive of
training costs are equal, and the factor shares in the model are equal to
the employment shares.
above that such changes in technology have taken place).19 The dotted
line in Chart 1 gives the path of wu when the output elasticity on skilled
workers in the production function increases uniformly from .3 to .4,
while that of unskilled workers declines accordingly. In this case the
results are even more dramatic: by the end, wu must decline by more than
75% relative to ws to keep S/U constant.
The simulated changes in relative wages are well beyond any
plausible range of market adjustments. For example, Chart 2 shows the
ratio of the wage for skilled production workers to the statutory minimum
wage, normalized to 1973 - 1. Even this ratio, which is intended to use
an extreme proxy for unskilled worker wages in the U.S., varies within a
small range over most of the period. 20  Furthermore, Freeman and Medoff
(1984) report that the widely heralded wage concessions of the early 1980s
reduced labor cost per worker by 7-12 percent in the auto industry, and by
10-15 percent in the airline industry.21 The simulations suggest that
even if these were relative wage reductions, they would be insufficient to
prevent S/U from rising as q falls. Time series data on relative wages
presented in Chapter II below suggest that they have changed very little
in recent years, which leaves employment to adjust to changes in q.
In sum, the foregoing model shows formally why flexible production
19For example, at Olivetti.
200nly from 1981 to 1985, when the minimum wage was unchanged in nominal
terms, does the ratio move significantly. Of course, when the minimum is
set the ratio falls accordingly.
"These are nominal cost reductions. Given inflation, the real wage
reductions were larger, but still low vis a vis the simulated relative
wage reductions for unskilled workers.
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entails the increased relative employment of skilled workers, and yields a
labor demand equation to test for the shift to skilled workers. The next
chapter takes these implications to the data.
CHAPTER II
Empirical Evidence on Shifts in Relative Labor Demand in the U.S.
A. Evidence on Product Life-Cycles
Economic theory does not provide a clear definition of product
life-cycle: it is a term used idiosyncratically by business managers to
suit the particular circumstances of their production process. Hence,
data on product life-cycles are very difficult to find. In general, it is
very hard to define a new product as distinct from a refinement of an
existing product. Two plausible and measurable definitions of product
life-cycle are the total period over which the product is being sold, and
the period between the peak sales of a product and its successor. Table 1
is an effort to shed some empirical light on changes in product life-
cycles. It shows annual shipments by model family for medium and large-
sized computers manufactured by International Business Machines (IBM) and
Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC).22 Two points are clear from Table 1:
- product life-cycles have shortened;
22These unique time series have been aggregated into model families on the
basis of expert opinion as to what constitutes substantially different
products. The opinions are those of the firm that collects the data,
International Data Corporation.
- the number of distinct products on the market at any one time
has risen enormously even within size classes.
By either definition, IBM and DEC product life-cycles have
declined substantially. For example, the IBM large-sized 360/50 model was
introduced in 1965 and sold for six years until being replaced in 1971 by
the 370, which sold for seven years. Since 1978, however, there have been
four product groups introduced, each of which has had a substantially
shorter life on the market. Using the other definition, the peak sale of
DEC's first offering, the 1040/50, occurred in 1969, and the peak sales of
the successor model did not occur until 1976. Thereafter, peak sales of
subsequent models arrived much more quickly, as new product introductions
were more frequent. Of course, it is not possible to know what the life-
cycles will be for models still being sold in 1987.
IBM and DEC have also increased greatly their degree of product
differentiation. The number of distinct products for sale at any one time
within a given size class has risen from one to as many as six or more.
The IBM 4300 series, for example, featured more than twenty-five models
from 1979 to 1985 alone, and DEC introduced six models of its mid-sized
VAX computer in just over one year. The implications of these
developments for production are striking. While in previous years the
firms produced, wrote software for, serviced and supported only one model
family, they now must do the same for many model families. Furthermore,
since demand is split among several products, mass production of each is
less attractive than if total shipments were accounted for by fewer
models.
IBM and DEC do not constitute a representative sample, and more
research is certainly called for. However, these data clearly suggest
that product life-cycles have shortened significantly in this large
industry. 23 Furthermore, recent work by Clark, Chew and Fujimoto (1987)
suggests that increased international competition in the auto industry has
led to shorter product development times and, hence, shorter product life-
cycles.24 Their research focussed on the product development process in
European, American and Japanese auto manufacturing companies. The authors
attributed much of the substantial Japanese advantage in product
development time to fundamental differences in the organization of the new
product development process. They found that after many years of
international competition, American firms were re-organizing along
Japanese lines, favoring the use of multi-function teams, and reducing
their deficit in product development time.25
B. Changes in Employment Mix and Relative Wages by Skill Group:
Manufacturing Production Workers
It is not possible, or even sensible, to identify a date at which
23Data on personal computers, currently being collected by Ernst Berndt,
ndicate a similar result.
4If new products are developed faster, life-cycles decline unless the
roduct line increases each time a new product is introduced.
5Product development time, or lead time, is the time needed to bring a
product from its inception to production. The average reported in this
study was 43, 62 and 63 months for Japanese, American and European
projects, respectively.
the shift from mass to flexible production occurred. Firms, affected by
broadly similar forces, reacted at different times and with varying speed
according to their own circumstances. Indeed, there is no reason to
believe that the shift took place with equal force in all industries,
since changes in product life-cycles and volatility in product markets may
have varied significantly across industries. In aggregate data, however,
a fundamental implication of the model is that the share of skilled
workers in total production employment should have risen since the early
1970s as the length of product life-cycles declined.
Data on employment and wcv,:gs by skill group and industry are
difficult to come by, particularly prior to recent years. Census
employment data are available, however, since 1900. The top panel in
Table 2 shows employment shares in the nonfarm economy by broad
occupational group from 1900 to 1950. The share of production employment
fell significantly as the share of clerical employment rose. The second
panel shows two series for craft and operative employment as shares of
production employment; the first includes construction craft occupations,
while the second does not. What is striking in both series is that the
share of craft employment changed very little from 1900 to 1950, while the
share of operative employment increased substantially. Operatives are
semi-skilled persons working with machines, and their relative employment
increase reflects the rise of mass production over the period.
The lower half of Table 2 shows manufacturing occupational
employment shares for 1950 to 1970. The relative movement out of
production employment continues, but now the increase is found in the
managerial, professional, technical and sales group. Within production
employment, however, the broad craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers
group rose only three percentage points over the twenty year period. The
census occupational data, as presented, are highly aggregated: they do
not, for example, disentangle occupational shifts within specific
manufacturing industries from employment shifts across stable industrial
occupational structures. They also do not measure increased skill
requirements within occupations. They are intended only to make the point
that prior to the 1970s there had not been a significant increase in the
share of skilled workers in manufacturing production employment. It is,
therefore, not the case that a shift to skilled workers in recent years is
simply the continuation of a long-term trend.
Two new data sources emerged in the 1970s providing detailed
employment levels by occupation and industry. The first and best are the
Occupational Employment Statistics, which, beginning in 1977, provide
employment levels by detailed occupations for two-digit SIC manufacturing
industries every three years. These data, published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, are drawn from state-administered surveys of the
complete population of establishments with 250 or more workers, and a
sample of smaller establishments. Each occupation has corresponding
Standard Vocational Preparation (SVP) codes, which give the amount of
training "required to learn the techniques, acquire information, and
develop the facility needed for average performance.... The training may
be acquired in a school, work, military, institutional or vocational
environment." It is thus possible to assign a training level to each of
the approximately 110 occupations in the production worker category.
There was an occupational redefinition coincident with the 1980 U.S.
Census, which fell between the 1980 and 1983 survey in these data. The
redefinition was quite minor for production occupations. Where
differences occurred, the occupations were linked using the SVP codes.
Once each occupation has a SVP code, consistent aggregate
occupational groups can be formed for the years 1977, 1980, 1983 and
1986.26 Employment shares may then be tracked over the ten year period.
This exercise was carried out on data for production workers in the four
largest durable goods industries, which together account for roughly one
third of manufacturing employment. Skilled occupations are those
requiring at least two years training, and include jobs such as tool and
die makers, machinists, electronic instrument repairers and foremen.
Semi-skilled occupations require more than three months and less than two
years training, and include many machine setters and operators and some
assemblers. Unskilled occupations require less than three months
training, and include simple assembly, material moving and laborer jobs.
These particular training-based groupings are consistent with those
recommended by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Table 3 reports the results, which show a significant increase in
the share of skilled production workers in three industries, but not in
electrical machinery. Electrical machinery shows no shift toward skilled
26I am grateful to the B.L.S. for providing the unpublished 1986 data.
workers, but exhibits a very large shift from unskilled to semi-skilled
workers.27 It is important to note that the method used in deriving these
statistics assumes no change in skill levels within occupational groups,
which will understate the true change if there is also upskilling within
occupations or groups of occupation. Much of the qualitative evidence
suggests that upskilling within production occupations is a significant
component of the reorganization of work for flexible production. If this
is the case, then our method for measuring the skill composition of
employment may be a significant underestimate. In addition, the
reclassification of assembly occupations between 1980 and 1983 was handled
by assigning the same skill composition for assemblers observed in 1983 to
1977 and 1980. This is a conservative technique since it removes any
upskilling from the large assembler occupations.
The increase in the share of the more highly skilled groups
proceeds from 1977 to 1983. Given that 1983 was near the trough of a deep
recession, one might expect the share of skilled workers to decline by
1986 as expanding output induces rehiring of lower skilled production
workers. However, the shift to higher skilled workers was reinforced in
the years 1983 to 1986, despite the growth in employment and output.
Table 4 shows total production employment figures and the aggregate
skilled worker employment share for all four industries. The total
27It is interesting to note the small share of skilled workers in the
electrical machinery industries in the U.S., Germany and the U.K.
Apparently, the production technology of this industry was relatively
intensive in its use of lower-skilled workers, and any shift so far in
the U.S. has been toward semi-skilled workers.
increase is over five percentage points -- seventeen percent of the 1977
share -- and it survives the cyclical upturn from 1983 to 1986.
While there was an increase in the relative demand for skilled
workers within production employment, the broader occupational composition
of employment continued to shift as it had from 1950 to 1970. Table 5
shows that the share of production and service employment fell by as much
or more from 1977 to 1986 in three of these industries than did the same
share in total manufacturing from 1950 to 1970. Meanwhile, professional
and technical employment -- a subcategory of M, P&T, S -- grew almost one
for one with the decline in the production share. Taken together with the
results from the previous tables, this presents strong evidence for an
increase in the relative demand for skilled workers.
Demonstrating increases in employment shares is not, of course, the
same thing as demonstrating changes in relative demand, since changes in
relative wages or other factors may have been responsible for increased
relative employment in the confines of stable demand. Two methods are
pursued to show that the observed movements in production employment
shares are not cases of stable demand responding to changes in relative
wages. First, Charts 3A and 3B plot the relative wages of skilled
production occupations versus those of various semi and unskilled
occupations. These figures show that relative wages have remained
remarkably stable since the early 1970's.28
28These figures are constructed using unpublished CPS wage data,
generously provided by the BLS.
If the changes in employment shares had been the result of shifts
in labor supply along a stable labor demand function, then the relative
wages of skilled workers should have fallen. In order for the employment
share of skilled workers to have risen and their relative wages not to
have declined, labor demand must have shifted outward. Consider two
simple cases. In the first, the employment share of skilled workers
rises, and relative wages remain unchanged because both labor demand and
labor supply shift out.2 9 For the second, assume that labor supply to
manufacturing is very elastic: high relative wages in manufacturing
induce workers to queue for jobs at the going wage.30 In this case,
shifts in labor demand alone yield the observed result, since employment
is demand determined. If unions set relative wages, then relative
employment may respond to shifts in demand while relative wages move very
little.31
It is worth noting that the failure of relative wages of skilled
workers to decline is surprising, given the changes in demographics.
Freeman (1979) argued that the influx of a large cohort of young people in
29The labor force grew over the period, and data on educational attainment
do show a significant increase (fewer people had less than 12 years
education, and more people had 16+ years), but the median number of years
completed changed very little. Furthermore, labor supply to manufacturing
for unskilled jobs is likely to have been very elastic to begin with. It
is therefore difficult to know to what extent the labor supply function
for manufacturing shifted out.
30See Loveman and Tilly (1988) for evidence on relative wages between
manufacturing and other sectors.
31Freeman and Medoff (1984) present considerable evidence that unions, in
fact, take wages out of competition and tend to reduce wage inequality
within production employment.
the early-1970s reduced their earnings below what standard human capital
models would predict. One implication of his findings was that as the
cohorts of young, relatively unskilled workers entering the labor market
in the late-1970s and early-1980s became smaller, the relative wages of
unskilled workers would rise given stable demand. The fact that no such
increase occurred further suggests a shift outward in the demand for
skilled workers.
C. Labor Demand Estimation
The second method for demonstrating change in demand is to estimate
labor demand functions for manufacturing production employment by skill
group. Most of the necessary data are available in the U.S. Bureau of the
Census' May Current Population Survey (CPS), which provides annual data on
individuals' occupation, industry and average hourly earnings. Each
month, roughly 60,000 individuals are surveyed by the CPS, and from this
survey weights are derived which allow the responses to be scaled-up to
population levels. The May survey is the only one in which respondents
are asked to report the wages on their current job. A panel of
occupational employment and wage data by industry was constructed using
the May CPS tapes for the thirteen years from 1973 to 1985. The sample
used below excludes the self-employed, those reporting zero hours worked
or zero wages on the current job, and those less than sixteen or more than
sixty-five years of age. Workers who worked less than thirty-four hours
per week, and hence are considered part-time, were included in the sample.
However, part-time work is uncommon among manufacturing production
workers. Throughout the period, their share is roughly two percent of
total employment in skilled production employment and five percent in
unskilled. There is no significant upward trend over the period.
The CPS provides data on individuals. From this base data mean
employment shares and wage ratios were calculated for three aggregate
occupational groups in each of twenty two-digit SIC manufacturing
industries annually for 1973-1985.32 Each observation in the transformed
data is, therefore, an occupation, by industry, by year cell. The three
occupational groups used are skilled production workers (craftsmen,
foremen and kindred workers), unskilled production workers (operatives and
laborers) and white collar workers (managers, professional and technical,
clerical and sales). These occupational groupings are a first cut at the
data and they rely on the efficacy of Census definitions as to which
occupations belong in which group. They also assume no increase in skill
within occupations. A more detailed analysis would begin with individual
occupations and aggregate, either as was done with the O.E.S. data, or
according to some other algorithm which distinguishes among occupations on
the basis of their likely role in flexible production. The problem with
the more detailed approach is the very small sample sizes for individual
occupations, particularly after 1978. Finally, there is a substantive
32The fundamental problem with the CPS data is that after breaking the
observations along twenty industry and three occupational group lines, the
cells are often quite small. In particular, beginning in 1979 only one-
quarter of the respondents were asked to report their wages, so the
problem is more severe from 3979 to 1985 and the occupational employment
and wage estimates are subject to substantial sampling error. In some
small industries in the post-1978 sample, only a handful of individuals
are sampled in one or more of the three occupational groups.
occupational redefinition in 1983, which makes the share levels non-
comparable across the periods 1973-82 and 1983-85.
The mean employment shares and relative wages for skilled and
unskilled production workers in all industries are shown in Table 6, and
they support the results given earlier from other sources. The share of
skilled production workers rises from 1973 to 1982, and continues to rise
in the new definitional structure as well. Relative wages are quite
stable throughout the period: they vary between a range of only 1.25 to
1.35 with standard deviation of only .026. Thus these data, too, support
the case for a shift in labor demand.
Equation (3) suggests that labor demand for skilled and unskilled
workers depends on wages, product life-cycles and training costs.
Unfortunately, product life-cycles and training cost data do not exist for
most industries. Hence, an alternative is pursued. Labor demand
functions are estimated with time trends included to proxy for shortened
product life-cycles over the sample period. Since we are primarily
interested in the employment shares of skilled workers rather than their
employment level, the dependent variable is the share of skilled workers
in total production employment. Accordingly, wages enter as ratios. The
unemployment rate is included because skilled workers are less likely than
unskilled workers to be disemployed in downturns: skilled workers tend to
have higher seniority, and can better perform several jobs when demand is
low. The estimating equation, therefore, is:
(S/P)it - a + $1(time)t + 62(newdef)t + $31n(Ws/Wm)it + 41n(ws/wu)it +
$5(UR)t + $61n(KS)it + vi(IND DUM) I + e (5)
where:
S - skilled employment;
P - total production employment;
time - time trend;
newdef - dummy for change in occupational definitions; - 1 for 1983-85;
ws - product wage of skilled production workers;
wm - product wage of white collar workers;
wu - product wage of unskilled production workers;
UR - civilian unemployment rate;
KS - constant dollar capital stock per production worker, by industry,
equipment and structures;
IND DUM - industry dummies.
i - two-digit SIC industries
t - year
Since the dependent variable in (5) is an employment share, the
expected signs of the coefficients require a little exposition.33 First,
the coefficient of primary interest is f1, and our model suggests #1 > 0.
The nature of the occupational redefinition implies P2 < 0. We have
argued that .5 should be > 0, and to the extent that skilled and unskilled
production workers are substitutes, we expect $4 < 0. The signs of 63 and
06 are ambiguous ex ante, since they depend on the degree of
substitutability among the inputs. Previous results on capital-skill
complementarity (Brendt and Christianson (1973)) were based only on a
white collar versus blue collar distinction. Complementarity between
skilled production workers and capital would imply $6 > 0.
33It is worth emphasizing here that this endeavor is not intended
primarily to recover parameters of the production function. Rather, its
goal is to look for a shift in demand, controlling for other factors
likely to influence S/P.
Estimation of (5) requires variables that shift supply to serve as
instruments for the industry/occupation wages. Not surprisingly, it is
very difficult to find good instruments. Characteristics of the workers
employed are invalid, since they are a function of demand. Even lagged
industry output is likely to be endogenous if shocks to output are
serially correlated. Consequently, several variables measuring
educational attainment in the workforce over time are used as instruments.
Specifically, the instruments are three variables measuring the annual
share of employed persons whose educational attainment is 7 years or less,
8 - 11 years, and 12 -15 years.34 While these variables are exogenous,
they have no cross-sectional variation and are not highly correlated with
the wages. Therefore, (5) is also estimated using OLS. It should be
stressed that the OLS estimates are merely partial correlations and have
no structural interpretation.
Table 7 shows the results from estimation of (5), using various
specifications and estimation methods. Column 1 gives the OLS estimates
of S/P regressed on the time trend, newdef, and UR, using only the time
series observations derived by aggregating across industries. The
coefficient on time is of reasonable magnitude - S/P rises by roughly five
percentage points over the 13 year period - and statistically significant.
The unemployment rate, too, has the expected sign and is statistically
significant, suggesting that the share of skilled production workers does
34The source for these data are annual issues of Educational Attainment in
the United States, published in the U.S. Bureau of the Census' Current
Population Reports series.
rise in downturns. In this and all subsequent specifications, experiments
were performed by splitting the time trend after 1982, and by interacting
it with UR to test for particular cyclical sensitivity to the 1982
downturn. The results were negative: the positive time trend remains
significant.
Column 2 reports results from the full panel. In order to adjust
for the relative size of each industry, the data are weighted by the
square root of production employment. If the error term in the regression
is a function of the size of the industry, as is the case in this sample,
OLS is inefficient due to heteroskedasticity. Weighting by the square
root of production employment reduces the heteroskedasticity and yields
more efficient estimates. The results are, not surprisingly, essentially
identical to those in column 1.
Column 3 reports the instrumental variable estimates of (5).35 The
estimated coefficients support the model. The share of skilled workers
did increase with time, after controlling for other factors, as evidenced
by the positive and significant estimate of fl. The point estimate for
04, the coefficient on the ratio of skilled to unskilled production worker
wages, is negative, as predicted by the model. The point estimate for 03
is positive, which suggests complementarity between white-collar and
skilled production employment. However, the estimated coefficients on
35These and all subsequent results are generated from weighting the data
as described above in the text. We experimented with inclusion of the
real price of raw materials, but it was never significant and had no
effect on the other estimated coefficients.
both relative wage variables are not significant. The large standard
errors result primarily from the poor fit in the first stage regression.
The educational attainment instruments have no cross-sectional variance,
and simply are not tightly correlated with the wages. Thus, while the
point estimates for 03 and #4 are consistent, they are rather imprecise.
Finally, capital stock per worker has a positive coefficient, as
predicted, significant at the 10% level.36  The unemployment rate has no
significant effect. Column 4 reports a more parsimonious specification.
The results are very similar to those in column 3. The stability of the
estimated coefficient on the time trend across columns 1-4 is striking:
adjusting for wages and the capital stock has no effect on the estimated
shift over time to skilled workers.
Columns 5 and 6 present OLS estimates. The likely presence of
simultaneity bias is evidenced by the fact that the estimated coefficient
for 84 changes sign. These results, which are simply partial
correlations, yield almost identical estimates for l1.
In sum, this section has shown that labor demand for manufacturing
production workers has shifted in favor of skilled workers since 1973.
This result is robust to a variety of specifications and estimation
techniques, and is consistent with the employment share and relative wage
findings presented in previous sections. The next section reviews results
from related studies on labor demand by skill group.
36See Chapter IV for results on the inclusions of investment rather than
capital stocks.
D. Related Work on Shifts in Labor Demand by Skill Group
While no other studies examine the skill composition of labor
demand for manufacturing production workers, several papers do examine
shifts in labor demand more generally. In an important study of the
complementarity between technological change and skill, Welch (1970)
argues that skill influences output in two ways: directly as a factor of
production, and indirectly by enhancing the allocative efficiency of the
other inputs. Welch contends that technical change is non-neutral across
skill groups, and tends to raise disproportionately the productivity of
more highly skilled workers:
If educated persons are more adept at critically evaluating new and
reportedly improved input varieties, if they can distinguish more
quickly between the systemic and random elements of productivity
responses, then in a dynamical context educated persons will be more
productive. Furthermore, the extent of the productivity
differentials between skill levels will be directly related to the
rate of flow of new inputs. (p. 47)
Welch's empirical work is restricted to a 1959 cross-section of
agricultural workers. He estimates an equation in which factor shares and
measures of nonlabor inputs and research expenditures are explanatory
variables for the relative wages of college versus less educated workers.
The results support Welch's hypothesis that research expenditures -- a
proxy for technological change -- increases the relative wages of college
educated workers, after controlling for factor shares. Welsh argues that
the rate of change in technology, not the level, is critical:
If production were to become technically static, eventually the
productive characteristics of all inputs would become fairly well
understood. Under such conditions it is difficult to understand how
education could enhance allocative efficiency. (p. 53)
In more recent work, Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) explore the
issue of whether more highly educated workers have an advantage -- are
more productive -- at implementing new technology. They argue that in
production environments experiencing rapid technological change there is
an abnormally high degree of uncertainty as to what constitutes effective
task performance, and rather extensive learning is required on the part of
the workers. Bartel and Lichtenberg test this claim by using plant-level
data for manufacturers to estimate a cost share equation for highly
educated (>12 years education) workers. They employ several measures of
technological change, including the age of the capital stock and the
amount of research and development expenditures. They find that the cost
share for highly educated workers is indeed a decreasing function of the
amount of experience with a technology; highly educated workers do have an
advantage when the production environment is characterized by rapid
technological change.
While these results do not speak directly to the issue of flexible
production and skilled workers, they are clearly consistent with our
theory. If flexible production is also, as we have argued, characterized
by chronic change in the tasks performed by workers and extensive learning
requirements, then the implications are similar in both cases.37 What is
central in all three models is the need for workers to learn and adapt,
37If Bartel and Lichtenberg's technological change measures are positively
correlated with reductions in product life cycles, then their empirical
results are supportive of our model.
whether it be due to technological change, alterations in the product mix,
reorganization of work, or all three.
Since research began on this thesis, there has been a flurry of
activity examining changes in the structure of relative wages by education
and demographic groups. It is important to point out at the beginning
that this work, discussed below, focuses on groups, such as college
graduates and non-manufacturing workers, that are not the main focus of
the empirical work in this thesis. Recall that the methodology of the
thesis was chosen to restrict the sample to manufacturing production
workers specifically because the restricted sample generates a more
powerful test for the central hypothesis of a shift in production regimes.
As is shown below, this hypothesis remains as an important explanation for
the unresolved findings from the recent work on the broader sample.
The most comprehensive recent work is Murphy and Welch's (1988a)
analysis of changes in relative wages across educational groups. Murphy
and Welch construct age/education cells annually from 1964 - 1986 from the
March CPS and estimate age-earnings profiles for several education groups.
They find that after years of decline, the relative return to education
rose enormously from 1979 to 1985, as the wages of college graduates rose
substantially relative to those with less education. Chart 4, a
reproduction of a portion of Figure 2 from Murphy and Welch (1988b), shows
the time series of relative wages for college and high school graduates,
with two different experience cohorts. The post-1979 increase is
striking, as the increase more than offsets the declines of the previous
decade.
Murphy and Welch (1988a) show that the increased relative return to
education is not consistent with stable demand. Indeed, since average
educational attainment was rising, stable demand would have implied
smaller education wage differentials. They argue that a demand-based
model in which changes in international trade influence sectoral
employment patterns is consistent with the observed pattern of relative
wages. In a subsequent paper, Murphy and Welch (1988b) calculate
comparable relative wage profiles by race and gender. The more
disaggregated results are then compared with employment distributions of
like groups by sector to see whether international trade-induced
compositional demand shifts translate into changes in relative wages that
agree with the observed patterns. For example, white women with less than
16 years education are far more likely than their male counterparts to be
in sectors other than durable goods; the sector hardest hit by the trade
deficit. This is consistent with the sharp rise in the relative wages of
women versus men since 1979 in this educational group.
The Murphy and Welch story is purely compositional: the shift in
relative demand comes entirely from changes in employment shares across
sectors. While the growth of international competition is important to
our story, Murphy and Welch do not consider within-industry changes, which
are the crux of our story. However, Table 8, reproduced from Murphy's
March 1989 NBER Fluctuations Conference remarks, shows that even in their
data most of the relative wage changes from 1979-86 are within two-digit
industries. In particular, for males with less than 16 years education,
the vast majority of the relative decline is within industries.38
The importance of within-industry changes has now been confirmed by
other studies. Blackburn, Bloom and Freeman (1989) examine competing
explanations for the "conjunction of falling relative/real earnings and
declining use of less skilled labor" (p. 8); i.e. the shift in relative
labor demand away from less skilled workers. Using a variety of
techniques, earnings measures, and education and occupational groups, they
conclude that roughly one-third of the decrease in relative earnings of
the less skilled from 1973 to 1987 was due to movement across industries
or other industry-related factors.
Next, the authors calculate the within-industry changes and regress
them on what are described as industry characteristics: the percentage of
females with various educational levels; the percentage of men less than
35; and the percent of the workforce that is unionized. They find that
only the unionization rate is a significant determinant of the within-
industry changes, and conclude that the results do not support within-
industry explanations. But in fact, what their results really show is
that the three explanatory variables they have chosen do not explain much
of the within-industry variance. The unexplained within-industry variance
38Recent work by Katz and Ravenga (1989) on Japan, which has a large trade
surplus in durables, also shows a demand shift toward more highly educated
workers, but the magnitude is lower than for the US. These results also
suggest that something more is going on. Future work by Katz and Loveman
will explore these issues in the United Kingdom, France and Germany.
remains critical to the observed changes in relative wages.
Finally, Blackburn, Bloom and Freeman calculate estimates of the
impact of de-unionization and the declining real minimum wage. They
conclude that these two factors together account for roughly another third
of the total decline in the relative earnings of the less skilled, leaving
another third unexplained. However, a major problem with this latter
calculation is that it does not explain why, despite the sharp reductions
in the relative wages resulting from de-unionization and the declining
real minimum wage, relative employment of the less skilled also fell. It
is precisely the poor employment prospects of the low skilled that is the
focus of this thesis, so these results only further emphasize the need for
explanations that can account for the co-movement of wages and employment
of the low skilled.
Moreover, while noting that unionism was an important boost to the
wages of less skilled blue-collar workers, the authors do not address the
causes of the decline in unionization that, in turn, affect wage
differentials. 39 It is quite possible that at least part of the decline
in unionization is related to the fact that industrial unionism was
developed to meet the needs of mass production. If the organization of
production is changing and unions are not themselves changing in order to
be attractive to workers and palatable to managers, then the two phenomena
may be closely related. In any case, the Blackburn, Bloom and Freeman
39Freeman has, of course, discussed the reasons for the decline of
unionism elsewhere, and the issue is by no means resolved.
study leaves unexplained a great deal of the changes in the relative wage
structure.
Bound and Johnson (1989) conduct a similar examination of changes
in the relative wage structure from 1979 to 1987. In their consideration
of the international trade argument of Murphy and Welch, Bound and Johnson
correctly point out that in order to have generated the observed changes
in relative wages, shifts in product demand must have been large enough to
more than offset the large demographic shift which increased the supply of
more educated workers (and, ceteris paribus, would have lowered the
relative earnings of the higher educated groups). They find that shifts
in product demand, "do not come close to overwhelming the perverse supply
changes that occurred during the 1980s. ... Further, the demand shifts
observed during the 1980s are only a slight acceleration of the trends of
the 1970s." (pp. 25, 32)
Bound and Johnson also examine changes in the incidence (across
industries) and average level of rents as sources of changes in relative
wages. The results are positive but small, due largely to the fact that
the observed wage changes are dominated by group rather than industry-
specific effects.
Bound and Johnson conclude that technological change is a:
Candidate to account for the major changes in the wage
structure. There is a great deal of anecdotal evidence that
production processes have changed significantly over the past
decade in a manner that favors more relative to less educated
workers.... It is somewhat unsatisfactory to conclude that
the principal cause of the major phenomena we sought to
explain was due to factors we cannot observe in our data set.
Further, it is difficult to conceive of ways that the
technological change hypothesis can be tested directly even
with an ideal data set. ... If technological change is the
correct explanation, however, we would expect that educational
differentials will not decline as the foreign trade deficit
shrinks in the 1990s. (pp. 33-34)
These studies of the U.S. wage structure have been discussed at
some length because they identify, but fail to explain, shifts in labor
demand consistent with those documented in this thesis. The connection is
far from complete: the samples are different as are the groupings whose
labor demand is at issue. The differences are, however, for two good
reasons. First, quite coincidentally, the ideas that motivate this thesis
were conceived well before the published debate on the wage structure.
Second, and much more importantly, the empirical tests in this thesis were
designed to bring maximum power to bear on the hypothesis of a change in
the organization of production, a within-industry phenomenon. They
purposefully exclude the across-industry and white-collar/blue-collar
dimensions that complicate the wage structure research. The results from
this thesis suggest that at least a portion of the mysterious within-
industry shift in labor demand may be due to changes in the organization
of production favoring more highly skilled workers. If the results from
the production workers only are correct, the overall shift in the skill
structure, including white-collar jobs, is even more substantial (as the
figures in Table 5 indicate). As was the case with Bound and Johnson, the
fundamental sources of the changes in the organization of production are
not observable. But the supporting evidence in this thesis goes a long
way toward identifying changes in the organization of production as an
important cause of the observed shifts in labor demand.
CHAPTER III
CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION
IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The preceding chapter showed that there has indeed been a shift in
relative labor demand favoring skilled production workers in the U.S.
While this result supports the hypothesis of a change from mass to
flexible production, it does not preclude other explanations. Increased
competition and volatility in product markets since the early 1970s has by
no means been purely an American phenomenon. Other industrialized
countries have also been affected by increased product market competition,
increased variance in input prices, and heightened consumer demand for
specialized products. Therefore, if the hypothesis of a change in the
organization of production is correct, these similar stimuli should have
yielded a shift in relative labor demand in other countries as well.
Historical and institutional differences across countries influence the
degree to which production regimes change, since these differences
establish initial conditions and affect adjustment mechanisms in each
country. But other factors, such as technology, can be effectively held
constant by looking cross-sectionally at advanced industrialized countries
such as Germany and the U.K.
This chapter uses cross-country variance in institutional
structures to generate additional testable implications of a change in the
organization of production. In particular, vocational training systems
vary enormously across countries. Since training systems determine the
supply and, to a great extent, the relative cost of skilled workers,
cross-country differences in vocational training systems affect
significantly the organization of production and the skill composition of
employment. In the context of the model in Chapter I, the greater
availability of highly skilled workers will generate a larger steady-state
(qt - q) share of skilled workers. In other words, the organization of
production is a function of the supply of skilled workers, as determined
by the training system.40 Furthermore, while the model did not consider
supply constraints explicitly, more pervasive training reduces the
likelihood that a shift to skilled workers stimulated by reductions in
product life-cycles will be impeded by sharply increased relative wages or
simply inadequate supply. Hence, a training system that fails to provide
skilled production workers can both militate in favor of a mass production
orientation and impede its transformation.
This chapter first documents the significant differences in
vocational training between Germany and the U.K. It then draws on these
differences to test hypotheses about how the organization of production
and skill composition of employment would vary across the two countries.
The main prediction of the analysis is that Germany should have had a
400f course, the organization of production may also influence the
training system.
larger share of highly skilled workers at any given point in time as a
consequence of its training system. The U.K., on the other hand, has a
training system less conducive to flexible production. Indeed, skilled
craftsmen are sufficiently scarce, and their job demarcations sufficiently
rigid, as to make flexible production difficult. Nonetheless, the stimuli
to flexible production common to industrialized countries in recent years
should have caused an increase in the share of skilled manufacturing
production workers in both countries. Data from Germany and the U.K.
support this prediction, and the dispersion in the level and changes in
employment shares by skill group suggest that factors other than simply
technological change determine the skill composition of employment.
A. Vocational Training
This section provides a brief overview of the vocational training
(VT) systems in Germany and the U.K. The German VT system is extremely
well suited to flexible production, because it provides workers with a
combination of practical skills learned on-the-job with theoretical skills
learned in the classroom. German youth complete compulsory full-time
schooling at age 15. Those who do not continue full-time education must,
for the next three years, attend, one day per week, a vocational school
associated with their job. In the case of industrial craft apprentices--
the VT group of main interest to this thesis--eligible employers have
discretion over the details of the practical training, subject to general
requirements stipulated in the Federal regulations for each trade.
Industrial craft apprentices may only be employed in shops having a
"Meister"--a craftsman of the same trade who has completed advanced
instructor training--to serve as the apprentice's supervisor. At the end
of the training period the worker takes formal examinations covering both
practical and theoretical knowledge. The examinations are standardized
nationally and are drafted and accredited by the Chambers of Industry and
Commerce. This dual system of practical and formal training is
administered by the federal Ministry of Vocational Training, with the
support of the employer's associations and trade unions. Together these
three groups determine the number of apprenticeships in each craft and
structure the curriculum. The current VT system has its origins in the
medieval guild system, and has functioned essentially unchanged for at
least sixty years.
The German craftsmen, having completed an apprenticeship, offer a
wide range of skills. The dual structure of the apprenticeship ensures a
mix of practical experience and general knowledge that is exceedingly
well-suited to an organization of production in which workers are required
to perform a wide and varying range of tasks. Industrial relations in
Germany feature a system of collaborative institutions between labor and
management that facilitate very wide job classifications. Work is
organized such that craftsmen perform a broad spectrum of tasks that take
advantage of their training.
The contrast with the U.K. is quite stark. The failure of VT is
one of the most often cited culprits in the demise of British
manufacturing; an allegation which is bolstered by a comparison with
Germany. British youth are not compelled to attend school past age 16.
Upon completion of compulsory education, youth may enter apprenticeship
training, which looks, at least superficially, much like German
apprenticeships. The Industrial Training Act of 1964 established
Industrial Training Boards, staffed by union, government, and employer
representatives, to oversee training in each industry. In some cases
formal classroom training and successful completion of examinations are
required. But, in general, an apprentice is required only to "serve his
time," a period of roughly three years, and on-the-job supervisors need
only have attended a several-day briefing course. Apprentices in many
crafts do take examinations set by the City and Guilds of London
Institute, but the exams cover only the theoretical portion of the craft
skills. On the basis of extensive comparative analysis, Prais (1986)
concludes:
It seems likely that the majority (of British apprentices)
have not passed any written examination, and only a small
proportion have undergone a series of tests comparable to
those in Germany (p. 181).
So long as technologies and markets were stable, a practical
training of the kind offered by the traditional British
apprenticeships may have been adequate. But when technology
advances rapidly, and production methods change and require
familiarity with a broader spectrum of technologies, it is to
be expected that the grounding in general principles provided
by the German methods of training yields a craftsman both
more capable of and more interested in adopting progressive
methods (p. 183).
In sum, VT for the best British apprentices--those who take
examinations in challenging crafts--is roughly equal to that in Germany.
But for middle and lower level trainees the difference is quite
substantial. Furthermore, in most cases union rules prevent wage
differentials on the basis of examinations or further study. Hence, as
Prais (1981a) argues, the British system is stuck between no compulsory
training and weak private incentives for training.
The result of this dilemma is evident in comparisons of quantities
of skilled workers between Germany and the U.K. Table 9 shows vocational
qualifications of workers in manufacturing industries in the U.K. (1974-
78) and Germany (1978). The "intermediate" group is made up almost
entirely of craftsmen and apprentices. The differences between the U.K.
and Germany are enormous: in essentially every industry, the employment
share of the intermediate group in Germany is twice or more that of the
U.K. The difference is reflected in the "none" category, which in the
U.K. consists of those with no educational or vocational qualification and
in Germany consists of those who failed, or did not take, their vocational
certification exam. Prais (1981b) argues that the qualification
categories are roughly comparable across the two countries, so the figures
in Table 9 reflect the true magnitude of the training gap. Moreover, the
current flows will only maintain or worsen the situation. Table 10 shows
recent awards of craft qualifications in Germany and the U.K. Despite
roughly equal total employment in manufacturing, Germany produced 2.4
times as many craftsmen, and their average training level was higher.
Indeed, the output of British VT has declined substantially in recent
years. The share of apprentices in training fell from 2.2 percent of
manufacturing employment in 1982 to 1.1 percent in 1987.41
41Employment Gazette, U.K. Department of Employment, Table 1.14, various
issues.
A recent issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy was devoted
to British VT and its poor standing vis-a-vis other OECD members. In
their contribution to this issue, Finegold and Soskice (1988) show that
whereas more than 85 percent of sixteen year-olds in the US, Canada,
Sweden, Japan, and Germany are in full-time education, a majority of
English students leave full-time education at age sixteen. Furthermore,
British employers not only do not make up the training shortfall, but
rather exacerbate it by spending much less on training than in other
industrialized countries.4 2 Finegold and Soskice argue that Britain is
locked into a low skill-low quality industrial organization in which poor
training leads to an organization of work and choice of final product
based on routinized, low skill jobs, which themselves discourage further
training. Wage structures which depend on seniority rather than skill
(unlike Germany, where the reverse is true) reinforce this outcome.
Quoting Tipton (1982), the authors conclude: "The key to improving the
quality of training is the design of work and a much needed spur to the
movement for the redesign of work...may lie in training policies and
practice" (p 28).
B. Changes in Relative Labor Demand in Germany and the U.K.
The comparison of training institutions suggests that, on the basis
of the model presented in this thesis, the employment share of skilled
manufacturing production workers should have been higher in Germany for
42British firms are estimated to spend .15 percent of turnover on
training, while the equivalent figure is 1-2 percent in Japan, France, and
Germany.
many years, and there should have been a shift in favor of skilled workers
in recent years in both countries. If the VT training system was a
serious impediment in the U.K., as seems likely, the shift should have
occurred later and more slowly in the U.K.
Germany
The German national statistical office surveys manufacturing
establishments quarterly and reports employment shares for three
production worker skill groups. The survey is a representative sample of
approximately twelve percent of all manufacturing establishments with ten
or more employees. The highest skill group includes jobs requiring formal
apprenticeship or equivarent training, while the intermediate group
includes jobs requiring less than that level but more than six months of
training. The lowest skill group is for jobs needing less than six months
training. (Note that only group 1 would be counted in the intermediate
category of Table 9.) With respect to the U.S. classification used in
Table 3, the highest German skill group requires more training -- three
years versus two -- than does the skilled group for the U.S. The average
training requirement is also higher for the intermediate German
classification. Finally, it is important to point out the establishments
with fewer than ten employees tend to have larger than average shares of
the highest skill groups. These small firms belong to the "Handwerk"
sector, which consists largely of maintenance and repair firms operated by
craftsmen. The exclusion of this group therefore understates the size of
the skilled worker employment share in the following discussion.
Unfortunately, wage data consistent with the employment shares are
not available at this time. Consequently the results that follow cannot
be interpreted as changes in labor demand. Efforts undertaken to obtain
unpublished data from the Germany Federal Employment Institute in Nurnberg
will hopefully bear fruit in future work.
Table 11 reports the employment shares from 1960-1987 for three of
the four durables industries used earlier for the U.S. Data were also
provided for the vehicles industry, but the time series included
unexplained breaks in the early 1980s and was therefore not included.
Three facts stand out in these statistics. To begin with, the share of
the highest skilled group has risen substantially over the period.
Second, the timing of this shift shows that much of it occurred rather
early, between 1960 and 1978. For example, the share of highly skilled
machinery workers rose six percentage points from 1960 to 1978. The
detailed U.S. data begins in 1977, so comparisons are difficult to make,
but it seems unlikely that such a large shift began so early in the U.S.
Finally, a very large portion of German production workers are highly
skilled. This is no doubt largely a consequence of the supply effects
from the VT system, but it nonetheless certainly influences the
organization of production. Given the more stringent definition of
skilled worker in the German classifications, it is clear that Germany has
a much larger share of skilled production workers in these industries than
does the U.S.
Table 12 gives employment shares by skill groups for production
workers in selected manufacturing industries in the U.K. These data come
from establishment surveys conducted prior to 1980 by the Department of
Employment and subsequently by the Engineering Industry Training Board
(EITB). Questionnaires are sent to all establishments with 1000 or more
workers, and to a sample of establishments with 11-999 workers. In 1980
data was collected from 7.9 percent of all establishments, covering 44.6
percent of all employees. The observed discontinuity in shares at the
time of the switch to the EITB (1979 to 1980) is largely the result of the
EITB not extrapolating its results from the 11-99 worker size group to the
non-sampled 1-10 size group (a group with a higher than average share of
skilled workers), minor changes in coverage within industries, and the
replacement of a fixed sample with a new sample. In any case, the data in
Table 12 are non-comparable across 1979-80. Time series data are
available only for five industries: those shown in Table 12, marine
engineering and metal goods not elsewhere classified. The latter two were
not pursued because of the very small size of marine engineering and the
residual nature of metal goods not elsewhere classified.
Two points stand out in the time series of employment shares in
Table 12. First, the shares were remarkably stable in mechanical
engineering and vehicles during the 1970s. Second, the share of skilled
production workers rose significantly after 1980. Thus, the pattern of
movement in employment shares predicted in the preceding discussion
obtains in mechanical engineering and vehicles. The shift to skilled
workers indeed happened, but it took place much later in the U.K. than in
Germany, and a little later than in the US. The definition of a skilled
production worker in these data--a craftsman in an occupation entered
through apprenticeship or equivalent training--corresponds with the most
highly skilled group of German production workers (with the caveats noted
in the preceding discussion). A comparison of the levels of skilled
workers is complicated by the break in the U.K. data in 1980, but
nonetheless in the machinery and electrical machinery industries --the
only two for which comparison is possible--the German share is
unambiguously higher. Finally, note that electrical engineering again has
a small share of skilled workers in the U.K., but their share rose by four
percentage points from 1973 to 1979 and a bit more thereafter.
Wage data are needed to demonstrate a shift in relative labor
demand in the U.K. Wages by occupation and industry are very difficult to
find, particularly with sample sizes sufficient to yield precise averages.
I began with the General Household Survey (GHS) of the U.K., an annual
U.K. version of the U.S. Current Population Survey. The GHS does provide
wage data by occupation and industry based on interviews with 30,000
individuals annually since at least the early 1970s. The problem is that
once the sample is limited to those at work in .anufacturing production
occupations, the cell sizes are very small and the average wages are
exceedingly imprecise.
More comprehensive data are available from establishment surveys
published by the Department of Employment. Table 13 shows relative wages
for male production workers in three industry groups (the only ones for
which the data were collected). Engineering is an omnibus industry
grouping that includes mechanical engineering, electrical engineering,
shipbuilding, vehicles and metal goods n.e.c., and in 1980 employed more
than one third of total manufacturing. Shipbuilding is a very small
industry, employing only roughly two percent of total manufacturing
employment in 1980. These data have the advantage of being comparable in
terms of occupational definitions with those in Table 12, but the survey
was discontinued after 1980. Since males constitute the overwhelming
majority of production worker jobs, the exclusion of women is not a
significant problem.
The relative wages of skilled workers changed very little from 1974
to 1980. In engineering, relative wages of skilled versus semi-skilled
workers varied little until 1979, when they rose roughly three percent.
After a drop in 1975, the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages was
essentially constant. Relative wages in shipbuilding moved very little
despite large employment losses, and relative wages in chemicals also were
stable. Taken together with the employment share data, the evidence
suggests very little movement in relative labor demand over this period.
A more comprehensive source of wage data is the New Earnings Survey
(NES). Conducted annually in the spring, the NES is a survey of roughly
120,000 people that is conducted through the individual's employer. Names
are selected randomly from the national insurance contribution records,
and matched to employers. Forms are then sent to employers for
completion. Each year approximately two-thirds of the sample is retained
to form a matched sample with the preceding year. The advantage of the
NES is its large sample size, but the cost comes in its imprecise
occupational groupings. The British occupational grouping system
separates manual from non-manual, but within the manual category the
occupations are grouped very broadly by function. A complete list of
occupations is given in Appendix A, but here only three groups are used:
group 14: Processing, making, repairing, and related
(metal and electrical)
group 15: Painting, repetitive assembling, product inspecting,
packaging, and related
group 17: Transport operating, materials moving, and
storing and related.
These three groups are the main manual occupational groups in
manufacturing. While skilled occupations exist in each of the three
groups (e.g., foremen), group 14 is made up mostly of skilled workers
while the latter two are not. Data are available separately for one
individual occupation--repetitive assembling--which is a semi-skilled job.
NES data with comparable occupational groupings are available annually
from 1976.43 Sample sizes are very small for women, so the analysis is
4 3Adjustments were made for the change in SICs in 1980.
limited to men. While the shares of women did rise in these occupations,
they were always quite small.
Table 14 reports the NES wage and employment data for 1976, 1979,
1985, and 1987. These years were chosen to include only years when the
British economy was relatively healthy, and thereby insulate the results
from major cyclical effects. Chart 5 plots the growth rate of real Gross
Domestic Product in the U.K. from 1972 to 1987. Note that 1976, 1979,
1985, and 1987 are all years of relative prosperity. Mechanical and
electrical engineering and vehicles were chosen for comparability with the
employment share data in Table 12. Despite macroeconomic growth,
employment in each of these three large durable manufacturing industries
declined significantly over the period. Finally, the data on relative
wages are ratios of group medians. While the standard error on group
averages were small--less than two percent--there were a few cases where
averages were not reported. The medians are, in any case, very close to
the averages. A typical sample size, say, for group 14 in mechanical
engineering or vehicles, was roughly 1600.
The relative wage data in Table 14 show little movement overall.
There are a few exceptions, such as a steady increase for 14/15.1 in
electrical engineering and a sharp drop for 14/17 from 1976 to 1979 in
mechanical engineering. The lack of major changes is not surprising given
the central role of egalitarian wage structures in British industrial
relations.44 However, as in the U.S., the critical finding is that
44See Prais (1981b).
skilled workers did not get any cheaper, which is sufficient to show that
relative labor demand must have shifted in favor of skilled workers in
order to generate the joint outcome of higher employment shares and stable
or slightly increased relative wages. Indeed, while the labor force in
the U.K. did grow over the period, the number of craftsmen declined as
apprenticeships fell significantly. Therefore, there is little evidence
of any increase in the supply of skilled workers.
The employment data in Table 14 are derived by simply taking the
ratio of the sample sizes for each group. The NES does not report sample
weights, but the initial sample was random, and thus self-weighting. The
use of significant (two-thirds) matched samples over time is not a problem
for our purposes so long as those already employed in any given year have
the same probability of holding a given job as do those just entering
employment (the matching effectively overweights those already employed,
although they needn't hold the same job since the inclusion in the sample
is based on simply being employed). In the U.K., production labor markets
are occupationally based and jobs are tied to a great extent to training
rather than seniority, much more so than in France or the U.S. Therefore,
longer tenure is less likely to push workers into more highly skilled jobs
and the bias in the NES matched data is not likely to be large.
The employment ratios show more movement than the relative wages.
The general pattern is for the ratios to drop a little from 1976 to 1979
when total employment was stable, and to rise from 1979 to 1985 when
employment fell.4 5 There is little change after 1985. Thus this evidence
confirms the employment share results from Table 12, and additionally
suggests that the major crisis hitting British manufacturing after 1979
was the stimulus to changes in the organization of production. The last
section of this chapter explores this point in the British vehicle
industry, and presents a case study from Germany that illustrates the
comparative results from Germany and the US.
C. Case Studies
1. The Car Industry in Britain
Employment in the British vehicles industry fell by more than forty
percent from a peak of 485,000 in 1978 to under 300,000 in 1983. Marsden
et, al., (1985) provide detailed occupational data for the industry, which
are shown in Tables 15 and 16. Table 15 provides more detailed
occupational data from the 1971 and 1981 population censuses. Marsden,
et. al., argue that, because other data show little change prior to 1979,
most of the observed changes took place from 1979 to 1981. Not
surprisingly, managerial and technical occupations gained in employment
shares, while clerical lost a bit. Among manual workers, skilled
occupations (those from foreman to motor mechanics) gained while the less
skilled jobs (from fitters to laborers) lost: the share of skilled jobs
in total manual employment rose from 23 to 30 percent, due largely to
45Employment'in mechanical engineering is buoyed by rising employment in
information technology equipment manufacture.
substantial declines among repetitive assemblers and laborers.
Table 16 gives more highly aggregated data from EITB surveys. In
this survey the manual occupations are defined simply as craftsmen,
operators and others (unskilled workers). Total employment fell by over
forty percent from 1978 to 1984, and, again, it was the lower skilled
manual workers who suffered the double blow of a declining share of a
vastly reduced pie. Craftsmen, conversely, experienced a modest increase
in employment share.
Marsden et. al. argue that the observed changes in occupational mix
arose from the drive for increased efficiency. Major
reductions have occurred in employment share for assembly
workers, labourers, and clerical and secretarial staff. The
assemblers have been affected partly by automation, but more
substantially by changes in working practices on the line
(p. 72).
The authors contend that the reorganization of production in the U.K. has
been hampered by the strict job demarcations associated with craft work:
Unlike the apprenticeship system in Germany the [British
system] regulates not just the acquisition of technical
competence but also access to craft work. Whereas the key
to German apprenticeships and skilled work lies in access to
technical competence, the pattern of regulation in Britain
relies more on access to "job territories," that is sets of
tasks and the use of certain tools which are the exclusive
right of certain groups of workers (p. 79).
Accordingly, it has only been in the context of the crisis in the auto
industry, and the need for survival, that the organization of production,
and hence the occupational mix, has begun to change. In contrast to
Germany, where training and the existing organization of production
facilitated such changes, flexible production came late and painfully to
the British motor vehicle industry.
2. Machine Tools in Germany and the US
A large body of research argues that mass production never
characterized German manufacturing to the degree it did U.S.
manufacturing. Loveman, Piore and Sengenberger (1987) argue that the mass
production of, for example, automobiles never developed as early or as
extensively in Germany as it did in the U.S. Instead, the share of
employment accounted for by small firms -- the handwork sector -- remained
large in Germany while it fell elsewhere. The availability of skilled
labor was one critical element in this different industrial structure, but
so too was the need to compete on international markets on the basis of
quality and customization rather than cost. German firms did not have the
large domestic markets for standardized goods available to them to the
extent that American firms did, and their high labor costs prevented them
from being low cost producers of commodity products. Furthermore,
industry-wide collective bargaining sets binding minimum wages for all
firms in an industry, which discourages mass production strategies based
on low labor cost.
Herrigal (1988) presents a comparison of the machine tool industry
in Germany and the U.S. that illustrates and elaborates these issues. He
argues that U.S. machine tool firms established an "industrial order"
based on large individual firms and a highly concentrated industry. Firms
faced high volume demand from mass production industries and from the
military, and produced relatively standardized products. The firms
provided worker training almost entirely in-house, and consciously
attempted to minimize these costs by reducing the need for skilled
workers. This industrial order made U.S. firms vulnerable to the crisis
of the 1980s, when the heretofore stable demand from mass production
industries destabilized, and competition from abroad increased the pace of
technological change. Herrigal argues:
U.S. producers' orientation to the market in both standard and
custom product areas lead them to be blinded to the important
shifts in demand. U.S. producers had traditionally based the
production of standardized machines on the assumption that there
would be little competition in their product area. Production
processes were traditionally rigid and firms eschewed customiza-
tion. (p. 25)
German firms, on the other hand, historically supplied smaller,
more specialized industries, and consequently never developed a strategy
based on high volume and standardization. As a result, the industry was
composed of small and medium-sized specialty firms, who employed
predominantly highly-skilled workers. In Germany's industrial order,
firms relied heavily on outside institutions; in particular, the public
system for vocational education, public research institutes, cooperative
banking, and a trade association. Hence, when the Germans, too, faced a
crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s, they were better able to respond
than were U.S. firms because they relied on cooperation and assistance
from a variety of external public and private sources.
D. Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to first identify and then exploit
cross-country institutional differences to generate unique testable
implications of a shift from mass to flexible production. This
international comparative methodology is a powerful analytical tool,
because it controls for variables, such as technology, which cannot be
handled adequately when examining the U.S. alone. Predictions made on the
basis of our model and fundamental differences in vocational training in
Germany and the U.K. were confirmed using time series occupational wage
and employment data from both countries. Finally, case studies were
presented which discussed in greater detail change in the organization of
production in the British auto industry and the German and U.S. machine
tool industries. The next chapter develops and tests further implications
of a shift from mass to flexible production using non-labor data.
CHAPTER IV
NON-LABOR TESTS FOR CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION
AND
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Recall that the fundamental methodological problem of Chapter II
was the unobservability of a key variable in the model. The results of
Chapter II show that the prediction of the model is confirmed if the
hypothesis of shortened product life-cycles over time is maintained. This
chapter attempts to solidify the connection between product market
conditions, flexible production and the shift to skilled workers. The
previous chapters established that there has indeed been a shift in the
composition of labor demand favoring more highly skilled workers in the
U.S., Germany and the U.K. The preceding chapter used international
comparative analysis to distinguish flexible production from competing
explanations for the observed changes in labor demand. This chapter, too,
seeks to distinguish flexible production from other possible sources of
the shift in labor demand in the U.S. The first two sections are positive
attempts to construct further testable implications of flexible production
that are based on non-labor data. The last section considers critically
other possible explanations for the shift to skilled workers.
Section A presents an industry-level proxy for unobservable product
life-cycles that can be used to predict the industries in which the shift
to skilled workers should be most pronounced. This proxy, the
intraindustry trade (IIT) index, was first developed by Krugman (1981) in
a model based on increasing returns production technology. An argument is
presented in this section that IIT may also arise from changes in business
strategy favoring differentiated rather than standardized goods, wherein
firms are able to differentiate their product(s) such that other firms
(domestic or international) cannot duplicate it. Section A begins with an
elaboration on Krugman's (1981) model, and then proceeds to use data on
IIT to generate a ranking of industries that can be compared with a
ranking from the labor demand data in Chapter II. The results support the
hypothesis that IIT has grown the most in the same industries that have
experienced the largest shift to skilled workers.
Section B draws on a mix of recent theoretical work by Milgrom and
Roberts (1988a,b) and case study work by Piore (1987) to develop an
implication of flexible versus mass production that is testable using
firm-level data. Specifically, firms using flexible production are,
ceteris paribus, less likely to hold finished goods inventories, since
•'fferentiated customer demands and frequently changing products make
holding inventories very costly. Mass producers of standardized goods, on
the other hand, must hold inventories only for the few products they sell.
Therefore, if there is a shift to flexible production, the margin between
order backlogs and finished goods inventories as alternative methods for
handling uncertain product demand should be moving toward order backlogs.
The empirical implication of flexible production is therefore an increase
in the ratio of order backlogs to finished goods inventories. The data
confirm that the ratio has indeed risen, despite problems in measuring
finished goods inventories accurately over time.
Section C concludes this chapter by evaluating the merits of
alternative explanations for the shift to skilled workers. There are a
few legitimate contenders, the main one being recent technological change.
However, the evidence presented here and in previous chapters suggests
that while technology played a role, the primary motivation for changes in
the organization of production came from product markets.
A. Intraindustry Trade
Intraindustry trade refers to two-way trade in products of the same
industry. Traditional international trade theory was based on comparative
advantage inducing countries to specialize in the production and export of
products for which they were the most efficient producer. The consequence
is interindustry specialization with no two-way trade in similar products.
Krugman's work is an effort to reconcile theory with the fact that much
trade is intraindustry. Krugman's (1981) model, exceedingly elegant in
its simplicity, proceeds from the assumption that consumers prefer a
diversity of products and that the existence of fixed costs results in
scale economies in production.
Scale economies prevent domestic competition from eliminating the
need for imports, and differentiated consumer tastes ensure that a variety
of products within an industry's output is preferable to one standardized
product. The solution to Krugman's model shows that the extent of IIT is
equal to his parameter z, which measures the similarity in factor
proportions between industries (e.g. the percentage of the labor force
employed in a particular industry). When z-l, countries have identical
endowments. More formally,
I -z
where
I - 1 - 1(IXk-MkI) / (XXk-Mk))]
Xk - exports of industry k;
Mk - imports of industry k.
If trade is balanced in each industry -- there is extensive IIT -- I
equals one. Complete industry specialization, such that each industry is
only an importer or exporter, yields I equal to zero.
The striking result that the index of IIT equals the index of
similarity in factor proportions fits with the fact that much IIT is
between industrialized countries with fairly similar factor endowments.
However, the reliance in Krugman's model on economies of scale to generate
IIT, and the notion that its extent is strictly linked to factor
endowments, are questionable. Krugman makes the crucial assumption that
all products are producible by any firm. Hence, given free entry, only
fixed costs of production prevent all goods from being produced
domestically. In fact, it is precisely the desire to avoid producing
something that anyone else can also produce that underlies the business
strategy of flexible production. Product details, specialization to meet
particular customer demands, quality and brand name identification are all
sources of product differentiation that prevent any firm from copying
another firm's product. Indeed, products do not simply appear. Rather,
they must be developed, and firms devote enormous resources to this end.
Consequently, as a particular firm introduces a series of new products, it
takes other firms a significant partod of time to respond.4 6 For these
reasons, firms are very concerned with product choice, customization to
meet the needs of particular customers, and flexibility to expedite
introduction of new products.
Furthermore, Krugman's (1981) model is entirely static. However,
it is shown below that IIT has increased significantly in many industries
since the early 1970s. Manipulations of Krugman's model would generate
this result if:
a. consumer tastes changed to favor greater product
differentiation
b. economies of scale in production became more prevalent
c. the index of similarity in factor proportions (z) increased.
46Assuming the technology is not trivial.
While (a) is certainly plausible, (b) and (c) are substantially less so.
A much more likely cause of an increase in IIT is an increase in
the prevalence of a business strategy premised on product differentiation
rather than standardization. If in the U.S., and in other industrialized
countries, firms are attempting to avoid standardized products where there
is extreme cost competition from other countries, then a widespread shift
to flexible production may be manifested in an increase in IIT.
While greater intraindustry trade (larger I) does not necessarily
imply shorter product life-cycles, it is certainly consistent with shorter
product life-cycles. If firms are competing on the basis of product
differentiation, they are producing for small segments of the market
rather than mass producing to capture the entire market. Moreover, since
firms maintain rents by producing products that are not easily replicated,
they have a strong incentive to innovate and increase product quality.
The result is shorter product life-cycles. However, the change certainly
need not be uniform across industries: ITT should have risen the most in
those industries where the shift to flexible production was most acute.
As the formula for IIT indicates, IIT is calculated from imports
and exports data. However, the trade data are calculated using industry
classifications that differ from the SICs. The trade data come from the
U.S. Bureau of the Census' U.S. Commodity Exports and Imports as Related
to Output. The data were aligned with the SICs and provided to me
generously by John Abowd.
Table 12 shows the change in the mean intraindustry trade ratio
between the two periods 1958-73 and 1974-84 for each of eighteen two-digit
SIC manufacturing industries. Changes rather than levels are used because
it is changes in product markets since the early 1970s that are associated
with changes in the organization of production. The data show that the
ratio increased in eleven of eighteen industries, and the unweighted mean
change was .08. Therefore, if intraindustry trade is a valid proxy, Table
17 suggests that product life-cycles have shortened in some, but not all,
industries. It is important to note that there is nothing in Krugman
(1981) to predict an increase in IIT, so the fact that it rose in some but
not all industries requires further explanation.
Given that product life-cycles are not observable for all
industries, the flexible production hypothesis is more powerful if it is
possible to predict ex ante, on the basis of observable variables, which
industries are most likely to have experienced a shift to flexible
production. Table 18 shows the ranking of industries in terms of their
increase in intraindustry trade, and in terms of the magnitude of the
shift to skilled production workers in the CPS data. The latter group was
derived by running a regression for each industry of S/P on a constant, a
time trend, newdef, and UR, and ranking the industries on the basis of the
coefficient on time.47 There is significant correspondence between the
47As was the case before, the inclusion of wage variables does not affect
two groups, particularly in the top seven: machinery, fabricated metals,
transportation equipment, paper, lumber and textiles appear in the top
seven of both groups. Petroleum is the only real outlier, appearing at
the bottom of one list and at the top of the other. Apparently there was
either a shift to skilled workers in petroleum that had nothing to do with
product life-cycles, or the peculiarities of the industry make
intraindustry trade a poor proxy.48
A more precise way to measure the predictive power of changes in
the intraindustry trade ratio is to compute rank order correlations
between a ranking of industries on the basis of the change in
intraindustry trade and the ranking on the basis of the estimated
magnitude of the shift to skilled production workers. The rank order
correlation -- Spearman's correlation coefficient -- resulting from this
procedure is .35, which yields a t-statistic of 1.5. Thus, while positive
and fairly large in magnitude, the correlation is insufficient to reject
the null hypothesis of independence between the rankings. However,
exclusion of the one severe outlier -- petroleum -- results in a rank
order correlation for the remaining seventeen industries of .61; the
associated t-statistic of 2.98 is sufficient to reject independence.49
the coefficient on time.
48Hirschhorn's (1984) discussion of process industries argues for higher
skill requirements as a function of both more sophisticated capital and
more differentiated products.
491f the Spearman correlation coefficient - p, then its t-stat is given by
[(n-2)1/2*p] / [(1-p2)1/21.
The use of IIT in the context of a model of flexible production
appears paradoxical, given the importance of scale economies in Krugman's
(1981) model of IIT. This section has suggested, however, that scale
economies are not necessary to generate IIT, and that something more is
needed to understand the dynamics of IIT. Changes in the IIT ratio do
seem to have considerable predictive power with respect to identifying
industries most likely to experience a shift to skilled workers. To the
extent that changes in the ratio proxy for changes in product life-cycles,
these results provide support for a shift to flexible production by
suggesting that shortened product life-cycles are responsible for the
observed changes in the skill composition of employment.
B. Flexible Production, Finished Goods Inventories and Building to Order
Firms may build to order, build to stock, or both. In the case of
production to order, each item is produced according to the specifications
of an existing customer order. In the case of production to stock, output
is produced on the basis of the firm's prediction as to what and how many
products will be purchased in the future. If, as has been argued in this
thesis, changes in competition and consumer tastes favor the production of
specialized goods, production to stock becomes increasingly costly when
goods in inventory fail to meet differentiated consumer demands.
Consider, for example, the contrast between pure mass production, wherein
the product is standardized, and pure flexible specialization, wherein
each item is unique. In the former case, finished goods inventories are
costly only with respect to carrying costs, since when demand picks-up
goods can be sold out of inventory. In the latter case, inventories will
not meet the specialized demands of consumers and must, hence, either be
sold at discount or remain in inventory. An intermediate case may be when
a firm produces many products, but the product line is stable. In this
case inventories are more costly than in mass production, but less so than
in flexible specialization where product demand changes rapidly. Indeed,
as the degree of product differentiation increases, such that the product
line is large and changing, so too does the likelihood that an inventoried
good will remain unsold a given period of time. The implication is that
as firms move toward flexible production they will, ceteris paribus,
increase their ratio of order backlogs (OB) to finished goods inventories
(FGI).
1. The Models
Support for this concept as a testable implication of changes in
production regimes comes from two quite dissimilar sources. First, in a
series of interviews conducted in conjunction with Piore (1987), managers
in American manufacturing firms emphasized the need for more highly
specialized products, closely suited to the needs of particular customers
or groups. Central to that goal, they argued, is the reduction of in-
process and finished goods inventories. With respect to the former, Piore
argues:
The (elimination of in-process inventories) has the advantage of
increasing the ease with which production can shift from one product
to another. As soon as those inventories are eliminated, attention
is focussed upon the relationship among work stations in an
altogether new way. In order to insure continuous production,
workers are forced to relate to, and learn to understand, adjacent
operations. This in turn creates an environment more conducive to
flexible machinery and more generally trained labor. (pp. 4-5)
The motivation for reduction in finished goods inventories follows
directly from firms' inability to maintain profitability in the sale of
standardized goods. Interview respondents stated that as product mix
increased, and as competitors quickened the pace of new product
introductions, their firms undertook significant efforts to reduce
finished goods inventories. These efforts featured both changes in
production methods and improved lateral communication between marketing,
manufacturing and engineering to better align production with demand.
It is the notion of communication as a substitute for inventories
that motivates recent theoretical work by Milgrom and Roberts (1988 a, b).
They argue that firms may respond to demand uncertainty by either using
inventories (build to stock) or learning more about demand before
undertaking production (build to order). Inventories are costly for the
usual reasons, while learning involves costs of information acquisition.
The mark-up of price over marginal cost is assumed to be an increasing
function of the size of the product line, and demand for each product is
random. They argue:
The choice of the optimal product line then involves trading off the
additional design and set-up costs of adding to the line against the
resultant improved price. Horeover, a broader product line means
that the market of each product actually produced is narrower, and
this is costly when producing for inventory because of the lost
pooling. In turn, this has implications for the relative
profitability of producing to (order) or to (stock). (p. 4, 1988a)
This framework captures very well the flavor of our story. However, there
is one important missing link between their model and ours: we describe
the product life-cycle declining over time, given the size of the product
line, as a function of competitor behavior. The Hilgrom and Roberts
model, instead, focuses on the relative costs of surveying potential
customers versus holding inventories. Hence, there is a dynamic element
missing from the Milgrom and Roberts model. Fortunately, their model
includes a parameter -- the thickness of the market (number of customers)
for any product given its pricb -- which can be varied to consider the
dynamic effects of competitor behavior.
The solution to Milgrom and Robert's very complicated model (in
which both the production to order versus stock decision and the size of
the product line are choice variables) shows that the relative
profitability of production to order increases with:
- decreases in the thickness of the market
- increases in the variability of per customer demand
- decreases in the cost of expanding the product line.
The introduction of new competitors with lower costs will reduce the
thickness of the market, which favors both production to order and a wider
product mix. In fact, Milgrom and Roberts (1988b) show how these are
mutually reinforcing (complementary) forces.
While Milgrom and Roberts do not model labor demand explicitly,
they argue that the "reduction in set-up costs achieved by flexible work
rules and broadly trained employees, so that production workers do the
setups rather than standing idle while specialists do this task, would
lead to (flexible manufacturing)" (p. 15, 1988a). Consequently, the
increased use of more highly skilled workers lowers the cost of expanding
the product line in their model, and favors production to order.
In sum, the Milgrom and Roberts model is quite close to our story
in spirit, is consistent with the case study evidence, and generates a
simple, testable implication of flexible versus mass production: to the
extent that firms are shifting to flexible production, the ratio of order
backlogs to finished good inventories should rise. This is, in fact, a
powerful test for a change in production regime because it rules out
competing explanations for the shift to skilled workers that have no
implication for the build to order versus stock decision. For example,
simple international trade stories have no such implication, nor do
international outsourcing hypotheses. Only a story based on pure
technological change being complementary with skilled workers and favoring
production to order will predict both results.50 The next section
presents the data and empirical results.
2. Empirics
50An increase, in the degree of uncertainty in demand for an individual
product has ambiguous implications for OB/FGI.
The testable implication derived in the previous section can be
stated simply: if firms were shifting from production to inventory to
production to order, the ratio of order backlogs to finished good
inventories at the firm level should have risen, after controlling for
other variables known to affect inventory behavior. The problem in
empirical implementation is inventory measurement. While order backlogs
are properly valued at the sale price, inventories may be valued according
to a variety of criteria each of which may yield a different dollar value
for a given physical inventory. Cross-sectional differences in valuation
methods are not important for this analysis, which is a time-series (or
"within") exercise, but problems do arise when a firm changes its
valuation method during the observation period. The accounting can be
quite complex, but the essential issues can be understood with a simple
example. There are two main alternative valuation methods: First In,
First Out (FIFO), and Last In, First Out (LIFO).5 1 A firm using FIFO must
account for each item as it leaves inventory on the basis of the cost of
the oldest item in inventory at the time (note: which item is actually
sold is irrelevant for the accounting). In a period of inflation this
method tends to understate the cost of goods sold, and, hence, overstate
profits, since the item leaving inventory has a replacement cost in excess
of its FIFO valuation. Not surprisingly, when inflation was high during
the 1970's, many firms wished to avoid the income tax burden associated
with this valuation method and switched to LIFO. Under LIFO valuation,
goods leaving inventory more accurately reflect replacement cost, and the
51The other valuation methods are average cost, a mix of LIFO and FIFO,
and replacement cost, which is much like LIFO.
inflationary boost to profits and taxes is avoided. Note, .owever, that
these valuation methods have the opposite effect on reported inventory
values: FIFO more accurately reflects the replacement cost of the reported
inventory than does LIFO.
To make this counterintuitive point clear, consider two streams of
identical products into inventory during four consecutive periods of ten
percent inflation:
Period Cost
1 $1
2 1.10
3 1.21
4 1.33
Total $4.64
Under FIFO, when one item is sold, the valuation of the remaining three
items is $3.64, while under LIFO it is $3.31. A firm using LIFO may, for
example, continue to value the item in inventory at $1.00 forever. The
magnitude of the difference in inventory value generated by the two
methods depends critically on how quickly inventory turns over. If the
turnover is rapid, the difference is reduced. Nonetheless, the
consequence for our purposes is that if firms shift from FIFO to LIFO
during an inflationary period, it would tend to raise OB/FGI even if, in
physical terms, no change had taken place. When inflation increased in
the mid-1970s, many firms did switch from FIFO to LIFO in an effort to
make measured profits more realistic and to reduce income taxes. For this
reason, a variety of results are presented based on attempts to control
for the influence of accounting methods. The results show a trend toward
a rise in OB/FGI.
Compustat provides annual income and balance sheet data on all
publicly-traded U.S. firms filing annual 10K reports with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Since both order backlogs and inventories are
assets, they must be reported, and finished goods inventories are reported
separately from raw materials and work in process. Compustat also
provides a variable giving the valuation method applied to the largest
share of the finished goods inventories. Firms may use several methods
concurrently, but all that is known to the econometrician is the method
applied to the largest share. This poses obvious problems if the split is
such that more than one method is significant and the shares change over
time. Efforts are made to control for this in the specification of the
estimating equation.
Data were drawn from the Compustat file covering all manufacturers
listed on the New York or American Stock Exchanges who were still in
business in 1987.52 The earliest year in the sample is 1970, and many
firms are observed over the entire 18 years. The base sample contains 424
firms observed on average for 10.5 years. The distribution of firms by
52This particular sample was used mainly for convenience. Data are
available also on failed firms and on firms traded over-the-counter. The
large sample of firms in our sample should be representative of business
practice.
two-digit SIC industries is shown in column 1 of Table 19. The sample is
heavily weighted toward durables producers--81% of firms--which tend to
have much larger average ratios of order backlogs to finished goods
inventories.
In order to test for a secular relative increase in production to
order, it is necessary to control for variables that may independently
influence inventory behavior. The three most important variables in this
regard are interest rates, the inflation rate, and some measure of the
business cycle. The interest rate measures the nominal cost of holding
inventories, while the inflation rate captures any increase in the selling
price for inventoried goods. Since inventories are known to have a
significant cyclical component, the unemployment rate is included to
decycle the date.
The inventory valuation problems are addressed in two ways. First,
the whole sample is used, including firms who change valuation methods,
and two terms are added to capture the effect of the accounting changes.
These two terms, one linear and the other quadratic, equal one in the year
when the accounting method applied to the largest share of FGI changes,
and increase yearly if the change is sustained. Many firms change methods
more than once, and these variables reset after each change. Hence, the
effect of accounting changes are allowed to follow an arbitrary second
order process. The estimating equation is thus:
In(OB/FGI)it - a + $1(TIME)t + P2(TBILL1)t + p3(ACPI)t + 04(UR)t +
P5(IVM)it + 66 (IVM)it + Ti(IND DUM)i + e (6)
where:
TIME - time trend
TBILL1 - one-year Treasury Note rate
ACPI - annual change in CPI
UR - unemployment rate
IVM - equals one in year of accounting change and l+n
n years thereafter
IND DUM - two-digit SIC industry dummies
i - two-digit SIC industry
t - year
The other approach to handling the accounting changes is to restrict the
sample in various ways, which we turn to shortly.
The first column of Table 20 shows the results of estimating
equation (6) with the full sample. The central finding is that OB/FGI has
increased significantly over the period, after controlling for interest
rates, inflation, the business cycle and changes in accounting methods.
The estimated coefficient on TIME suggests a 1.7% increase per year, which
amounts to a substantial increase when sustained over ten or more years.
The estimated coefficients on the interest and inflation rate variables
suggest that the costs associated with carrying inventories are more
tightly correlated with the inflation rate than with the interest rate.
Theory, and common sense, suggest a positive coefficient on the interest
rate and a negative one on the inflation rate. Instead, the results are a
positive significant coefficient on inflation and no explanatory power
from the interest rate. The coefficient on UR has the predicted negative
sign: FGI tend to be high and OB tend to be low at the onset of
downturns, and FGI run down while OB rise during upswings. However, the
coefficient is estimated very imprecisely. Finally, the IVM terms are
also statistically insignificant, although their point estimates show that
OB/FGI did tend to rise as many firms moved from FIFO to LIFO during the
inflationary mid-1970s, but at a declining rate.
Column 2 of Table 20 shows the fixed effects, or within estimates
from equation (6). The data were transformed into deviations from firm-
specific means, thus eliminating fixed effects which, if present, may bias
the OLS estimates in column 1. The reported standard errors are adjusted
fr the degress of freedom lost in taking deviations from firm-specific
Jeans. The coefficient estimates in columns 1 and 2 are, however, quite
close, which suggests that fixed effects are not terribly important in
this case. 53 The coefficient on the time trend is smaller but still
significantly positive, and the other coefficients change very little.
The remaining columns present results from various subsamples
chosen to eliminate problems from changes in inventory valuation methods.
The sample in column 3 excludes all observations for each firm in the
years following a change in valuation methods. Hence firms are observed
only up until their first accounting change, if one occurs. The results
are almost identical to those in column 1.
The sample used in estimation for column 4 excludes a firm if it
ever changes accounting methods. This sample is the only one which yields
an insignificant time trend, although the point estimate remains large and
positive. The same remark applies also to the coefficient on inflation.
53Note that none of the regressors are firm specific.
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The most conservative subsamples upon which to test the model are
comprised of only those firms using FIFO, since there is no time series
distortion in inventory valuation. The estimation results from the FIFO
samples are shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 20. Column 5 includes all
years during which a firm uses FIFO, even if they are off FIFO during an
intervening period. The last column includes only those years prior to
the first switch in valuation methods. The results show no difference
across samples in the estimated coefficient on the time trend; it is large
and significant in both cases.
Table 19 shows that the industrial distribution for the FIFO
subsample is very close to that of the full sample. The means of OB/FGI
by industry are higher in some cases and lower in others, but the
differences are small, particularly given the larger sampling error in the
smaller sample. The lack of a substantial difference in the means
suggests that there are not profound differences in the two groups that
influenced their choice of accounting methods. Opinions from experts in
this field indicate that essentially all firms with inventories could have
reduced their tax burdens by switching to LIFO.54 Therefore it is hard to
see why all firms did not make the switch. The experts' speculation is
that the firms that choose not to convert to LIFO might tend to be those
with either rapid inventory turnover or low inventory/sales ratios (lower
54The experts were Patricia O'Brien, Professor of Accounting, MIT, and Joe
Genovese, Partner, Arthur Young & Co., Boston. Their opinions were
communicated privately.
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gains from tax savings). However, these factors tend to vary
significantly by industry, and hence the figures in Table 19 suggest that
these were not important determinants of the choice to use FIFO. The use
of subsamples to check for stability of coefficient estimates is a useful
method for examining sample selection bias. The uniformity of results
across five different samples suggests that sample selection bias may not
be a serious problem.55
In sum, tests involving different specifications and subsamples
confirm a secular rise in OB/FGI, in accordance with our predictions that
there has been a shift from building to stock to building to order. In a
previous section of this thesis growth in intraindustry trade (IIT) was
used as an indicator of industries in which flexible production may be
increasingly prevalent. A distribution of industries ranked on the basis
of growth in IIT was found to be very highly correlated with the
distribution generated on the basis of the magnitude of shift in the skill
composition of production employment. A similar industry analysis was
conducted using the Compustat data. The results, discussed below, are
mixed.
Table 21 shows regression results for durables and non-durables
industries from the total sample (column 1 of Table 20) and the FIFO only,
no changers sample (column 6 of Table 20). While the estimates vary
55More careful explicit treatment of the sample selection problem (e.g.
"Heck-it") in this case would be exceedingly involved, since firms often
change methods more than once. Each period's choice could then have to be
modelled conditionally on previous choices. The results suggest that
further work along these lines would not be fruitful.
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little between the total and FIFO samples, there is a striking difference
between the durables and non-durables industries. The estimated
coefficient on the time trend for non-durables is much larger and more
precisely estimated than for durables. Indeed, the point estimate for
non-durables implies a four percent annual increase in OB/FGI. The other
estimated coefficients in the non-durables samples are also more precisely
estimated than in the durables samples, but the signs on the interest rate
and inflation terms remain counterintuitive.
The final row in the top panel of Table 21 shows that durables
industries have, on average, much higher OB/FGI ratios. The regression
results indicate that this gap is narrowing over the sample. However,
this does not bode well for matching industries with the results from the
skill composition data, since the latter was dominated by upskilling in
durables industries (with some exceptions). The lower panel of Table 21
lists those industries which had significant positive coefficients on the
time trend in each case. Leather is a small and idiosyncratic case in the
Compustat data (1.5% of the sample), but otherwise the remaining three
industries appear, too, in the other column (there are no paper firms in
the FIFO sample). Petroleum remains an outlier, while in the case of
machinery there was a positive but insignificant estimated time trend in
the FIFO data. Interestingly, the estimated time trend for electrical
machinery is negative but insignificant, which is consistent with the lack
of a shift to skilled workers. Thus, there is some uniformity in the top
portion of both rankings.
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However, when the entire list of industries is ranked on the basis
of the estimated magnitude of the time trend coefficient in the OB/FGI
regressions, and the ranking is compared to that from the CPS skill
composition data, the Spearmen rank correlation coefficient is nearly
zero. Thus while the industries at the top of both lists are very similar,
these two models do not generate closely correlated rankings for the
remainder of the distributions. This is due in part to the idiosyncrasies
of the leather and petroleum industries. Their exclusion from the lists
improves the rank correlation coefficient, but does not make it
significant. The fact that Compustat includes only large public firms,
while the CPS data came from workers in firms of all sizes, and
differences in the time periods in the two samples (1970-87 vs. 1973-85)
respectively), may also generate some of the discrepancies. The
differences between the behavior of the non-durables and durables
industries in the two models are also clearly important.
This section set out to show that the new theoretical models of
Milgrom and Roberts (1988a,b) were very close to the case study evidence
and to the model pursued in this thesis. The central testable implication
of these models was shown to be consistent with the analysis of the
previous sections. In fact, the test for a relative shift to production
to order rules out several of the competing hypotheses raised in the
context of the upskilling results. Empirical work was then presented
which showed that, despite formidable accounting problems, there is clear
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evidence of an increase in OB/FGI. A comparison of the industries
identified as moving most toward flexible production using this model and
the skill composition model yielded mixed results; conformity at the top
of the distribution, but little correspondence thereafter. Nonetheless,
the results from this section provide supportive evidence that the changes
in the skill composition of production employment documented above were
generated by changes in the organization of production.
C. Alternative Explanations for the Shift to Skilled Workers
We have already demonstrated that simple labor supply changes
cannot explain the skill composition data. Perhaps the most obvious
demand story is that the demand for more skilled workers has risen
steadily over a long period of time. Table 2, however, shows that there
is no evidence in employment share data for a secular rise in skill
demands. Instead, the data suggest that structural change -- in
particular, the growth of mass production -- increased greatly the share
of semi-skilled operatives who manned the mass production machinery.
The lack of an increase in the craft share of manufacturing
employment is not surprising if viewed in the context of the ongoing
debate over automation and deskilling. Braverman (1974) argues that
automation moved many workers from the laborer occupations to the
operative occupations simply by bringing them into contact with mass
production machinery, without raising skill requirements at all.
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Meanwhile, automation and its increased division of labor tends to reduce
the need for craft, or more general, skills. There is, therefore, nothing
in his analysis to support the prediction of a secular rise in the demand
for skilled production labor. Furthermore, a well-known study by Bright
(1958) reported on detailed analyses of thirteen of the most advanced
production systems in operation in the mid-1950s. On the basis of this
research, Bright concludes that there was a negative relationship between
skill requirements and mass production automation.
A recent study provides an extensive review of research on the
relationship between technological change and the skill composition of
employment. Spenner's (1988) review of the literature for the National
Academy of Science includes research whose sample periods range from the
late 19th century to the 1980s. He concludes that, despite extensive
research:
The major positions in the debate - the upgrading, downgrading, and
mixed-change or conditional arguments - have failed to receive a
clear verdict from the collective body of evidence... Compositional
shifts appear to account for relatively more of the upgrading;
content shifts appear to account for more of the downgrading. (pp.
174-75, emphasis added)
Thus there is no obvious presumption that technological change, alone,
leads to the upgrading in skill requirements identified in this thesis.
In fact, Spenner agrees that non-technological factors are critical for
skill requirements:
Most important, the effects of technological change on the skill
requirements of work are set in a larger context of market forces,
managerial prerogatives, and organizational cultures, all of which
condition the effects of technological change. The force of
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managers, markets, and organizational cultures are sufficient to
reverse the effects of a technology on skill upgrading or
downgrading. (p. 132)
In its study of the skill consequences of information technologies, the
OECD (1988), too, argues that while information technologies have the
potential to raise skill requirements, the outcome hinges on work
organization and managerial behavior.
A second alternative explanation is that only recent technological
change in capital requires more highly skilled workers. The argument is
that while technological change per se may not raise the skill
requirements of production workers, recent technological change has been
concentrated in the application of information technologies which do tend
to raise skill requirements. There are two variants on this position. In
the first, upskilling takes place within the confines of mass production.
Alternatively, technological change itself lowers the cost of flexible
production and induces the shift from mass to flexible production; there
need be no stimulus from product markets. In the Milgrom and Roberts
model, such a shift is triggered by reductions in new product set-up costs
and the costs of surveying potential customers. More generally,
reductions in unit costs for small batches and lower retooling costs are
cited as motivations for flexible production. 56
56Milgrom and Roberts (1988b) cite several examples:
- a recent survey of aerospace and other high precision industries
indicates that 8.2 percent of all batches were of size one and 38
percent were sixteen or less;
- Allen-Bradley Co., a maker of electric controls, is reported to
produce 725 products and variations with a minimum batch size of one
and an average changeover time for resetting equipment of six
seconds;
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It is possible to distinguish conceptually between a shift to
flexible production as a result of technological change and a shift due
primarily to changes in product markets. In practice, these two forces
may be connected, and data do not exist for the key characteristics of
either. Consequently, it is very hard to prove attribution to one or the
other in a large sample. For many purposes such attribution is
unnecessary, since the resulting relative shifts in the demand for workers
by skill group obtain in either case. However, it is important to
understand the separate roles played by product market conditions and
technology in order to anticipate the effects of changes in one or the
other (e.g. changes in product market competition resulting from rising
wages abroad). In what follows, evidence is presented which supports
product market conditions as the stimulus to flexible production.
The timing of changes in production regime provide critical
evidence in this regard. Milgrom and Roberts (1988b) correctly point out
that, "Moves towards 'the factory of the future' have involved discrete,
discontinuous and substantial changes in a whole range of the firm's
activities." (p. 3) In their model this is the result of exogenous input
price changes triggering action which, due to complementarities among the
components of flexible manufacturing, lead to large discontinuous changes.
- Benetton, an Italian apparel manufacturer, maintains inventories
of undyed clothing and uses nightly sales data - telecommunicated
from each store - to determine what colors to make and where to ship
the output.
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Specifically, reductions in the costs of product design and the costs of
flexible manufacturing equipment stimulate the shift. Once the investment
in flexible equipment has been made, there is an incentive for frequent
product changes. This leads to the purchase of computer-aided design
(CAD) technologies, which lower the cost of changing the product, and so
on. While the model is static, the implicit dynamics envision
technological progress simply arriving at a point where the costs are low
enough to trigger the change.
One simple way to test for the role of technology in generating the
shift to skilled production workers is to recognize that when the change
in production regime takes place in the Milgrom and Roberts model, firms
must invest in new capital equipment. Hence there should be a
contemporaneous relationship between investment and changes in the skill
mix. This hypothesis was tested by adding investment in nonresidential
equipment to equation (5). The results were no change in the level or
significance of the time trend and an insignificant coefficient on the
investment variable. One year lags yielded similar results. Better
measures of technological change would be preferable, but if technology is
the driving force its effect should be evident using the investment data.
The case study evidence cited above and interview evidence from the
Piore (1987) project suggest that product market conditions are the
critical factor. Improvements in flexible manufacturing technology have
been ongoing for many years. The decision to reorganize production at
the firm level was always driven by important changes in the product
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market, typically involving the onset of lower cost/higher quality
competition. In many cases the changes in product markets were sufficient
to jeopardize the existence of the company. Managers then searched for
answers in the form of new business strategies. New technologies were
certainly put to use in support of these strategies, and in some cases the
technologies influenced the formulation of the strategy itself. But, it
was not the case that firms facing tranquil product markets suddenly
observed a recent technological change and transformed their organization
and business strategies to capitalize on it.
The experience of Xerox Corporation is a useful illustration.
Xerox had been a highly profitable producer of photocopying equipment and
up until the late 1970s had a very large market share. In the mid to late
1970s many firms - Kodak and several Japanese firms - developed the
knowledge necessary to introduce copiers that were cheaper, higher quality
and easier to service that Xerox's product line. Furthermore, these firms
were able to introduce new products faster than Xerox, which made it very
difficult for Xerox to catch-up. Xerox managers discovered that a large
part of their deficiency lay in the fact that they designed and built
copiers with many more parts and much more complicated designs than did
their competitors. The results were higher parts costs, much longer
design lead-times, lengthy assembly processes, frequent malfunction and
difficult repair procedures. Among the reforms initiated in response to
the crisis was a unification of the formerly sequential engineering
process. Rather than having design engineers, working in isolation,
"hand-off" completed plans to manufacturing engineers who then had to
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figure out how to build the product, teams were formed that included
designers, manufacturing engineers, marketing and service staff. The
teams were given extensive computer-aided design/computer-aided
manufacturing (CAD/CAM) resources, but not because the technology got
cheaper: CAD/CAM capabilities were better exploited by the teams.
CAD/CAM keeps the design fluid, as designs need not be committed to paper
and prototypes need not be built. This facilitates the team approach by
allowing frequent design modification by all parties without forcing the
engineers to start over each time.
Examples of this sort are plentiful, and the central point is
clear: technology is an important enabling factor, but it is rarely the
cause of substantive reorganizations from mass to flexible production. 57
Zuboff (1988) focuses on the organizational consequences of the spread of
information technologies (IT), and shows that the implications for job
content are by no means clear. She distinguishes between two capacities
of information technologies: automating and informating. The former
refers to automating operations "according to a logic that hardly differs
from that of the nineteenth-century machine system." The latter refers to
the "simultaneous generation of information about the underlying
productive and administrative processes through which an organization
accomplishes its work. It provides a deeper level of transparency to
activities that had been either partially or completely opaque." (p. 9)
Zuboff's evidence shows that the automate or informate decision is not
technologically determined, but rather is idiosyncratic to the
57See Piore (1987) for a few more examples.
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circumstances of the firm. The choice, however, has profound implications
for job content. Automation often involves deskilling, while informating
gives workers more information and increases their responsibility for
inspection (quality), repair, coordination, decision-making, and planning.
These changes are fundamentally a response to firms' decisions to
compete on the basis of customized, high quality goods rather than on the
basis of cost for commodities produced with an extensive division of
labor. Hirschhorn (1984), for example, argues that preparation and
learning are becoming the core elements of production work because
mechanical (or process) failure is an increasing function of quality
standards and product variety. When General Electric reorganized one of
its electrical distribution equipment plants in an effort to increase
product variety and reduce delivery time, the tasks performed by
production workers changed dramatically. The New York Times (10/17/88)
reports that a production worker's job changed from machine set-up man to
a collection of tasks including resolution of machine malfunctions,
planning and ordering parts for future machine maintenance, and membership
on a committee that interviews job applicants.
In sum, it is difficult to attribute responsibility for the shift
to flexible production to product market factors or pure technological
factors. The case study evidence, however, suggests that product market
considerations were primary and technology was enabling. Furthermore,
what data are available do not support the claim that technological change
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was the crucial factor.
Finally, outsourcing of the lowest skilled components of production
to other countries is a possible, although not very likely, explanation
for the rising share of skilled production workers. The premise is that
mass production processes can be cleanly divided such that the low skill
end can be exported. While exporting production generally is feasible,
the justification for exporting the low end is less clear. For example,
subcontracting of component production may be undertaken outside the U.S.,
but the remaining domestic assembly process will involve largely low skill
assembly jobs. In this common example, the effect of outsourcing would be
to lower the share of skilled production workers (note: it may raise the
share of skilled workers overall, including white collar workers). Hence
it is not easy to simply export the low skilled production jobs only.
Moreover, fixed proportions technologies imply that some skilled workers
are needed to set-up the machines, make the tools and dies, etc. In
addition, outsourcing is a technique for arbitraging labor cost
differences. It is not obvious, however, that the savings are greater for
low skill production work than for high skill production work.
Furthermore, in the interviews associated with Piore (1987) we were
told repeatedly that outsourcing production abroad had been a problem
because production was taking place too far away from design and
engineering: it was too difficult to change the components in response to
the demands of new products of better quality. Indeed, many firms were
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consciously bringing production of components back as close as possible to
their main production and engineering facilities as a part of their
overall reorganization for more flexible production. Consequently, while
outsourcing is not observable in our data and hence cannot be ruled out
formally, it does not seem likely to be a big part of the reason for the
observed shift to skilled production workers.
114
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Recapitulation
This thesis began with a reference to the decline in U.S.
industrial competitiveness, and to a diagnosis that places much of the
blame on inadequate organizational structures and poorly trained workers.
The central hypothesis of this thesis has been that a fundamental change
in the organization of American manufacturing from mass to flexible
production can be tested for by examining changes in the composition of
production employment by skill group. In other words, there is indeed a
critical connection between changes in the organization of production and
the training, or learning, required of workers. The relationship between
the skill requirements of workers and a shift from mass to flexible
production was illustrated with case studies from firms that have
reorganized for flexible production. The critical element in these case
studies was the change in the nature of work performed by production
workers, and changes in the relationships between workers. Rather than
performing a very limited number of repetitive tasks in isolation from
other parts of the production process, as was the case in mass production,
workers involved in flexible production perform a broad and varying range
of tasks and often work in teams with both other production workers and
white collar workers. This very different type of work requires chronic
learning, and requires workers to have a conceptual understanding of the
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overall production process. Consequently, firms that use flexible
production will shift their hiring towards groups for whom learning, or
training, is least costly. It is worth emphasizing that persistent change
in products and job tasks is critical to this argument. If firms simply
shift from mass producing one product tc mass producing another, perhaps
more sophisticated product, it behooves them to again use a highly
specialized division of labor and cheaper unskilled workers. It is only
when frequent learning is required that firms will seek workers whose
higher wages are justified by lower training costs.
A simple model was presented to formalize these ideas. Firms were
modelled as employing two types of workers, skilled and unskilled, and
these workers required training to produce each new product. It was shown
that as the length of product life-cycles declines, relative employment
shifts toward the group whose training costs are lowest, unless relative
wages adjust sufficiently to offset the difference in training costs.
Model simulations of reductions in product life-cycles were presented
which showed that, for plausible parameter values, downward movement in
the relative wages of the unskilled were not likely to be sufficient to
offset the training cost advantage of skilled workers. Hence, the model
predicts that reductions in product life-cycles induce a shift in the
composition of production employment favoring skilled at the expense of
unskilled production workers. In other words, a testable implication of a
shift to flexible production is a shift in relative labor demand toward
skilled workers. The model also yields labor demand functions to test for
changes in relative demand.
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Chapter II presented substantial empirical evidence to show that
labor demand has indeed shifted in favor of skilled production workers.
Detailed occupational data from the Occupational Employment Statistics
showed a significant increase in the share of skilled workers in the total
production employment of the four largest durables manufacturing
industries. Relative wage data were presented which showed, if anything,
a mild increase in the relative wages of skilled workers. These two facts
together are evidence of a shift in relative labor demand. However, more
rigorous testing for shifts in labor demand was conducted using the May
Current Population Survey. Data on the wages, occupation and industries
of employment of individuals were used to construct a panel data set in
which each observation is an occupation by industry by year cell. The
panel covers two occupational groups, skilled production workers and an
aggregate of semi and unskilled production workers, and twenty two-digit
industries annually from 1973 to 1985. Since product life-cycle data are
not available, a simple time trend was used as a proxy. The results from
instrumental variables estimation of the labor demand equations is a
significant shift, both economically and statistically, toward skilled
workers. This change in the relative demand for labor is an important
finding irrespective of its cause. When combined with the long run shift
from production to white collar employment, the results indicate a severe
decline in the employment prospects of unskilled workers.
These findings are consistent with recent research showing a large
decline in the relative wages and employment of less educated workers.
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Indeed, the current state of research on changes in the relative wage
structure finds a large, unexplained within-industry decline in the
relative wages of the less educated. This thesis provides a promising
explanation for the currently unexplained within-industry shifts in labor
demand generating the changes in relative wages. However, this thesis
focuses on manufacturing production workers while the relative wage
structure research includes all workers. An attempt to generalize the
findings of this thesis awaits further work.
Chapter III employs international comparative methodology to test
the hypothesis of a change in the organization of production. If the
factors stimulating change in the U.S. are present elsewhere, the shift
should also be occurring elsewhere. Variance in institutional structures
and history should generate testable predictions about cross-country
differences in the timing and magnitude of the changes in the organization
of production. Perhaps most importantly, the international comparisons
hold constant variables such as technology, and thereby permit more
powerful tests of the central hypothesis of this thesis. In particular,
Chapter I suggests the critical role played by the supply of skilled
workers in influencing the choice of production method. Germany and the
U.K. provide a stark contrast in vocational training systems that should,
if the model is correct, be reflected in differences in the organization
of production. It was shown that the German dual vocational training
system provides a large supply of certified craftsmen whose training is
very well suited to flexible production. Essentially the contrary is true
in the U.K. Furthermore, rigid craft job demarcations in the U.K.
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severely inhibit changes in the task structure. The testable implications
are, then, that Germany should have used flexible production more
pervasively even years ago, as reflected in higher employment shares for
skilled workers; both countries should have experienced a shift to skilled
workers in recent years; and, the shift should have come earlier in
Germany.
Employment composition data from Germany and the U.K. were
presented which confirm the predictions. Germany has a very large share
of skilled production employment, compared both to the U.S. and U.K., and
the share rose significantly from the early 1970s to the early 1980s. The
U.K., on the other hand, has a much smaller share of skilled workers, and
the share rose significantly only in the 1980s. A case study from the
British auto industry shows in detail the significant changes experienced
by British industry around 1980. Finally, a case study is presented which
shows how the machine tool industry was for decades organized around
flexible production in Germany while being based on mass production in the
U.S., and discusses why the German industry responded so much better to
the crisis that hit the industry worldwide in the 1980s.
Chapter IV further attempts to identify the cause of the changes in
relative labor demand by articulating testable implications of flexible
production that are based on non-labor data and, hence, are less subject
to alternative explanations. First, a case is made for intraindustry
trade as a proxy for the product differentiation strategies associated
with flexible production. If this case is valid, the index of
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intraindustry trade should have risen in those industries where there was
a shift from mass to flexible production. Intraindustry trade is
calculated for each of the two-digit SIC manufacturing industries from
1958 to 1984. Changes between the periods 1958-73 and 1974-84 are
calculated for each industry and a ranking is made on the basis of the
change. This ranking is found to be significantly positively correlated
with a ranking made on the basis of the shift to skilled production
workers. The results suggest that, to the extent that increases in
intraindustry trade are a proxy for reductions in product life-cycles,
reductions in product life-cycles are an important cause of the shift to
skilled workers.
Second, current theoretical work by Milgrom and Roberts (1988a,b)
is used to generate a testable implication of the shift from mass to
flexible production that is based on the choice between building to order
or building to stock. In short, when firms are mass producing a single
product, inventories are an effective means for responding to uncertain
demand for that product. When, on the other hand, product differentiation
strategies lead firms to produce a wide and varying mix of products,
inventories are very costly as many products must be held and consumers'
specialized demands may not be met by inventoried goods. Consequently,
production to order may be preferable. The simple testable implication
is, therefore, that if firms are moving from mass to flexible production,
the ratio of order backlogs to finished goods inventories should increase.
Compustat data on publicly traded companies from 1970 to 1985 are
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used to test for an increase in this ratio over time, controlling for
variables known to influence inventory behavior (e.g. the interest rate).
The analysis is complicated by changes in accounting methods for inventory
valuation, but the use of many sub-samples yields a robust result that the
ratio of order backlogs to finished goods inventories has indeed risen.
Efforts to rank industries on this basis and compare the ranking to that
based on the labor data provided mixed results: considerable uniformity at
the top of the ranking, but little correlation elsewhere. Thus the
results support the hypothesis of a shift to flexible production overall,
but the industry level behavior cannot be linked clearly with changes in
the skill composition.
Third and finally, Chapter IV considers alternative explanations
for the observed shift to skilled production workers. It bears repeating
that the focus on production workers excludes traditional technological
change stories based on white collar for blue collar, or capital for blue
collar substitution. In fact, time series data from 1900 forward were
presented to show that the shift to skilled production workers is not the
continuation of a long-standing trend caused by, say, secular
technological change. A review of the literature on technological change
and Job content was presented which shows that there is no clear
relationship between technological change and increases in skill
requirements of production workers. Quite the contrary, important studies
of automation in mass production found reductions in skill requirements.
Outsourcing of low skilled jobs abroad is also considered, and found to be
an unlikely explanation.
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The alternative that is most likely to be an important factor in
the change in relative labor demand is that recent technological change,
rather than product market conditions, led firms to shift to flexible
production. While the qualitative evidence on the technology and job
content is mixed, it is certainly possible that information technologies
have raised the skill requirements of workers by increasing their
information processing and decision-making responsibilities. Inclusion of
investment variables in the labor demand equation as a proxy for
technological change yields insignificant coefficient estimates and does
not alter the magnitude or precision of the time trend coefficient. But
more importantly, extensive case study evidence of firms moving to
flexible production suggests that the stimulus came from heightened
competition in product markets, and technology was an enabling factor. If
technology were primary, the organizational changes should have been
coincident with technological changes. In fact, the organizational
changes were coincident with changes in product markets, such as the loss
of market share to international competitors.
In sum, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a shift
in the organization of production from mass to flexible production has
taken place in the U.S. from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s. This shift
has been manifested by an increase in the relative demand for skilled
workers, resulting in a deterioration in the employment prospects of the
unskilled. International comparisons involving Germany and the U.K. show
that the changes in the organization of production found in the U.S. are
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also at work in other western industrialized countries, but the nature and
extent of the shift vary in predictable ways as a function of historical
and institutional circumstances.
B. Methodological Issues
The methodology pursued in this thesis is atypical, but so too is
the nature of the problems under consideration. Changes in the
organization of production are systemic, involving a wide range of
variables that define and influence an organizational structure. Many of
the important variables, such as product life-cycles, are difficult to
define tightly and even more difficult to measure. Others may be
subjected to influences in addition to those generated by the change in
production methods; e.g., the composition of employment in a particular
industry may be affected by technological or trade-induced changes
idiosyncratic to that industry.
The most common response to these difficult methodological problems
has been to use case studies, which-control for most of the problems by
severely limiting the sample. The results, of course, are equally
limited. This thesis attempts to move research on changes in the
organization of production more into the mainstream of modern economics
by, first, introducing a simple formal model, and, then, testing
hypotheses on large sample data using econometric methods. The results do
not demonstrate the verisimilitude of one hypothesis to the exclusion of
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all others. Rather, the collection of results makes a strong case for a
shift from mass to flexible production, and shows that there has, in any
case, been a shift in relative labor demand favoring more highly skilled
production workers in the U.S., Germany and the U.K. If these problems
are actually important, less than conclusive evidence may have to suffice
until new data collection and research mature sufficiently to provide more
precise evidence. There is, however, a clear tradeoff: efforts to narrow
the research to yield more convincing results threaten to undermine the
intrinsically systemic nature of the issues.
C. Policy Recommendations
If flexible production is preferable to mass production in the
current economic environment, its emergence and institutionalization
should be a beneficial phenomenon. Poliy concerns arise, then, from two
sources: remedying any adverse effects suffered by particular groups in
the adjustment process; and, fostering institutions that both facilitate
the adjustment and maximize the long-term effectiveness of flexible
production in the U.S. With respect to the former, this thesis has shown
that the employment prospects in manufacturing for unskilled production
workers have clearly deterior!ated. More generally, the U.S. relative wage
structure research has shown that less educated workers have suffered
large relative wage and employment losses overall (i.e. over all sectors
of the economy). Indeed, since unskilled manufacturing production jobs
offer wages far in excess of unskilled service jobs, the loss of the
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unskilled manufacturing jobs is a severe blow even if other employment is
available. Blackburn, Bloom and Freeman (1989) show that this sort of
sectoral recomposition of employment accounts for a significant portion of
the relative wage losses suffered by less educated workers.
In addition to wage losses, the change in relative labor demand may
also have significant unemployment consequences.58 Workers often
experience unemployment spells even if they subsequently are successful in
finding work elsewhere. Less fortunate workers may either exit the labor
force, or wind-up in long-term unemployment. The large wage gap for
unskilled workers between manufacturing and other sectors may induce
workers to wait in unemployment in the hope of finding reemployment in
manufacturing. Katz's (1986) work, for example, shows workers'
willingness to wait extensively for recall to jobs in durables
manufacturing. In the U.S. vigorous overall employment growth mitigates
the transitional unemployment problem, but in most western European
countries slow overall employment growth aggravates the difficulties faced
by the unskilled in finding alternative employment.
Since the transition that is generating the shift in labor demand
58In Germany, Kern and Schumann (1988) argue, on the basis of extensive
case study research that:
A particular group is precluded from joining the workforce
because its members do not hae the qualifications
prerequisite for employment in a modern plant. These
persons are burdened with the risk of becoming unemployed
and must fear long-term unemployment sooner or later. (p.
23)
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is desirable, policies should not be put in place that retard adjustment.
The pure efficiency grounds for policies to assist workers experiencing
unemployment or wage losses are, therefore, ambiguous, because it is
possible that these costs may expedite adjustment. It may be, however,
that policies aimed at facilitating workers' movement from manufacturing
to other sectors may enhance efficiency by reducing transitional
unemployment.59 Specifically, policies aimed at increasing the mobility
of unskilled workers, providing training to unskilled workers, and, at the
local level, regional development policies designed to foster job growth
in proximity to where job losses are taking place, are the most promising
candidates. Sweden's labor market program is a useful model. It spans
all of these dimensions, and its interventions are designed to quickly
reallocate labor away from declining industries and occupations and toward
expanding ones.60
Policy has a much less clear role in addressing directly relative
wage losses. A more attractive alternative is to encourage the training
necessary for unskilled workers to acquire more highly skilled jobs. This
may be accomplished via subsidies to employers who provide training,
publicly provided training, or subsidies to individuals who undertake
private training (e.g., vocational/technical schooling).
59Research (Jackman and Layard (1988) and Blanchard and Summers (1986))
has shown significant duration dependence in unemployment, which suggests
that in order to be most effective, these policies must embrace workers
quickly after they are disemployed.
60See Standing (1988) and Bjorkland (1986) for descriptions of Sweden's
system.
126
Reform to training institutions is a vital, perhaps the vital,
institutional change needed to support the long-term health of flexible
production in the U.S. Piore and Sabel (1984) discuss the broad scheme of
institutional reform required to support flexible specialization. The
remainder of this section is limited to a brief discussion of vocational
training, since the provision of skills has occupied a central role in
this thesis. 61
Vocational training in the U.S. is, in a word, diverse. Unlike the
German system, vocational training takes place in many places and in many
forms. An apprenticeship system exists which is accredited by the federal
government, but it provides only a small portion of the skilled workforce.
While the apprenticeships define the crafts themselves, many workers enter
the crafts by obtaining "equivalent" qualifications from alternative
sources. Employers are also large providers of training which is itself
quite diverse, ranging from formal classroom instruction to informal on-
the-job training. Employers in many cases cooperate with local technical
or vocational schools in the provision of particular curricula, or
employers simply hire the graduates of such schools and supplement their
training with firm-specific skills.
Maurice et. al. (1986) argue that education, business organization
and industrial relations are all inextricably connected in any nation's
institutional structure, and this is certainly true in the U.S. The
61For a more complete discussion of the training implications of a shift
to flexible production, see Loveman, Piore and Sengenberger (1988).
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essentially chaotic U.S. training system reflects the largely unstructured
nature of American labor markets and the diverse nature of industrial
relations (e.g. craft versus industrial unions, and low union density
generally). It is also the product of the lack of compulsory training
past the minimum school withdrawal age of sixteen. In this context, the
imposition of a much more highly structured system, such as the German
system, is simply not feasible, despite its many virtues.
Rather, the needs of flexible production for skilled workers must
be met through adaptation of the existing structure. There are obviously
large private incentives for firms and workers to establish effective
training systems, but coordination and accreditation remain problematic.
One of the great advantages of the German system is formal and rigorous
accredation which makes skills portable across firms. Employer-provided,
or otherwise idiosyncratic training such as that most often found in the
U.S. is much less portable. Employers may wish to establish skill
recognition agreements with suppliers or through trade associations to
facilitate workforce adjustments in response to demand shocks.
Portability -- greater general training -- may reduce firms' willingness
to pay for training, hence increasing the need for better institutional
arrangements to promote training. The shrinking presence of unions is a
drawback in this regard, since unions could act as the source for skill
accreditation.
In addition to private incentives, government policy could be
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effective in expanding the scope of the existing apprenticeship system,
improving its quality, and better coordinating its content with employers
and unions. Financial aid to workers pursuing apprenticeship or
equivalent training is also desirable to more rapidly increase the supply
of skilled workers. Finally, America's success in generating a
satisfactory vocational training system is clearly predicated on the need
for pervasive high quality elementary and secondary education.
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Chart 4
Trends in Wage Differentials, 1963-1986
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TABLE 2
OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYHENT
1900 - 50
TOTAL NONFARM ECONOMY1
(shares of total employment)
1900 1910 1920
25.6 25.0 24.3
5.3 8.3 11.5
M, P&T, S
C
Manual and
Service 69.1 66.7
MANUFACTURING
(shares of production em
Craft, et. al.2  55 49
Operatives2 30 31
1930
27.5
11.9
64.2 60
nployment)
48 52
31 30
Craft, et. al.3
Operatives3
1950-70
MANUFACTURING
(shares of total employment)
M, P&T, S 12.7 16.7 17.8
C 11.0 12.2 12.5
P,S 76.3 71.1 69.7
(shares of production employment)
Craft, et. al. 26.4 28.7 29.2
.6
1940
27.0
12.4
60.3
49
37
39
45
1950
25.3
12.8
61.9
51
40
42
48
__
Craft, et. al. 26.4 28.7 29.2
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Definitions:
M, P&T, S = Managerial, Professional and Technical, and Sales
C = Clerical
P,S = Production and Service
Craft et. al. = Craftsmen, foremen and kindred workers
Total production employment includes craft et. al., operative and
kindred workers, and laborers.
Notes:
1 Sectoral data are not available for the full period 1900-50 for the
broad occupation groups, so total nonfarm economy data are displayed.
However, roughly half of the manual and service category is accounted
for by manufacturing.
2 It is not possible to distinguish what portion of employment in
certain craft occupations (e.g. carpenters) is in the construction
versus the manufacturing sector. Therefore, this row includes craft
employment in both the construction and manufacturing sectors. See also
note 3 below.
3 This row exlcudes employment in construction craft occupations.
Source: Kaplan, David L. and M. Claire Casey, "Occupational Trends in
the United States: 1900 to 1950," Working Paper No. 5, U.S. Bureau of
the Census, 1958; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Occupation by Industry,
1950, 1960, 1970.
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TABLE 3
EMPLOYMENT SHARES BY SKILL GROUP
PRODUCTION WORKERS
Industry 1977 1980 1983 1986 1986/1977
Fab. Metals
(34)
S .244 .253 .324 .329 1.35
SS .289 .297 .384 .380 1.31
U .467 .450 .291 .289 0.62
Machinery
(35)
S .354 .356 .448 .455 1.29
SS .434 .399 .363 .347 0.80
U .212 .245 .189 .198 0.93
Elec. Mach.
(36)
S .291 .275 .285 .282 0.97
SS .233 .380 .374 .385 1.65
U .476 .346 .341 .330 0.69
Transport
(37)
S .332 .346 .367 .368 1.11
SS .274 .365 .334 .321 1.17
U .394 .289 .299 .310 0.79
Note:
S - skilled, defined by Standard Vocational Training Code of 7 or
higher;
SS - semi-skilled, defined by SVT of from 4 to 6;
U - unskilled, defined by SVT of 3 and below.
Source: U.S. Dept. of Employment, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Occupational Employment Statistics, various issues; Dictionary of
Occupational Titles; and author's calculations.
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TABLE 4
PRODUCTION HMPLOYHENT
(millions)
1977 1980 1983 19186
SIC 34 1.19 1.16 1.01 1.06
SIC 35 1.37 1.52 1.15 1.18
SIC 36 1.20 1.25 1.12 1.08
SIC 37 1.33 1.19 1.07 1.23
Total 5.09 5.12 4.35 4.55
Z skilled 30.8 31.0 35.8 36.1
Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational
Employment Statistics, various issues.
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TABLE 5
EMPLOYMENT SHARES BY BROAD OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS
Industry 1977 1980 1983 1986
Fab. Metals
(34)
M,P&T,S 13.6 15.0 15.4 15.2
C 9.3 9.8 9.3 10.1
P,S 76.3 75.3 75.3 74.7
Machinery
(35)
M,P&T,S 22.3 24.4 27.3 28.6
C 12.7 13.3 14.2 13.2
P,S 64.3 62.3 58.5 58.2
Elec. Mach.
(36)
M,P&T,S 22.9 25.9 27.7 32.4
C 11.7 12.3 12.1 12.0
P,S 64.9 61.7 60.2 55.6
Trans. Eq.
(37)
M,P&T,S 18.4 23.3 26.2 27.4
C 8.7 9.7 10.3 9.7
P,S 72.3 66.9 63.5 63.0
Note:
M,P&T,S = Managerial, Professional and Technical, and Sales
C = Clerical
P,S - Production and Service
Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational
Employment Statistics, various issues.
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TABLE 6
EMPLOYMENT SHARES AND WAGES FROM THE CPS
1973-85
YEAR SKILLED UNSKILLED SKILLED/UNSKILLED WAGES
1973 .26 .74 1.32
1974 .27 .73 1.31
1975 .29 .71 1.29
1976 .28 .72 1.30
1977 .27 .73 1.30
1978 .27 .73 1.30
1979 .28 .72 1.31
1980 .31 .69 1.33
1981 .31 .69 1.25
1982 .30 .70 1.29
1983 .26 .74 1.29
1984 .28 .72 1.26
1985 .28 .72 1.35
Note: A redefinition of occupations in 1983 makes the
1973-82 shares non-comparable with the subsequent figures.
Source: May Current Population Survey, annually from 1973-85.
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TABLE 7
LABOR DEMAND ESTIMATION
CPS DATA, 1973-85
(standard errors in parentheses)
OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
a .22 .051 .509 .081 .272 .032
(.02) (.025) (.276) (.068) (.144) (.027)
31 (time) .0033 .0042 .0043 .0041 .0040 .0044
(.0014) (.0018) (.0020) (.0018) (.0017) (.001)
3 2 (newdef) -.0426 -.0467 -. 0644 -.0422 -.0536 -.0494(.0143) (.0141) (.0239) (.0172) (.0144) (.014)
331n(Ws/wm) - - .248 - .0166 -
(.259) (.0383)
3
41n(wsIWu) - - -.233 -.095 .0424 .0590
(.284) (.195) (.053) (.038)
35 (UR) .0067 .0036 .0011 .0026 .0033 .0042(.0028) (.0033) (.0045) (.0040) (.0034) (.003)
161n(KS) - - .0659 - .0464 -(.035) (.0273)
N 13 260 260 260 260 260
Note: the dependent variable is the share of skilled workers in
total production employment. The coefficients on the 19 industry
dummies are excluded from the table. Instruments are given in the
text.
Sources:
employment and wage data: May CPS, 1973-85;
industry output deflators: National Income and Product Accounts,
implicit price deflators by industry; B.E.A. Survey of Current
Business;
KS: constant dollar capital stock per production worker, by
industry, BEA Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the
United States.
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TABLE 8
DECOMPOSITION OF RELATIVE WAGE CHANGES
BY EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE1: 1979 - 1986
source of change
Education Composition Within Growth4 Total
Men: experience 1-5
8-11
12
16
Men: experience 6-10
8-11
12
16
Men: experience 11-25
8-11
12
16
Men: experience 26-35
8-11
12
16
Women: experience 1-5
8-11
12
16
Women: experience 6-10
8-11
12
16
Women: experience 11-25
8-11
12
16
Women: experience 26-35
8-11
12
16
-3.5
-4.4
1.0
-2.4
-2.9
2.7
-0.8
-0.9
1.7
-1.0
-0.1
1.4
-4.1
-2.4
2.5
-2.9
-2.7
4.3
-2.8
-0.6
2.9
-1.5
-0.7
1.0
-13.4
-10.3
5.9
-13.6
-5.1
8.7
-5.9
-3.9
2.1
-4.1
2.2
3.8
-9.9
-1.8
8.1
-4.8
3.1
11.0
5.5
8.1
10.0
4.1
7.0
8.9
-2.5
-1.5
2.1
-2.2
-1.0
2.0
-1.9
-0.6
1.6
-1.5
-0.2
1.5
-0.4
2.2
4.1
-0.5
2.2
4.0
-0.5
2.0
4.3
-0.1
2.0
4.3
-19.7
-17.2
8.5
-19.0
-10.0
13.4
-9.0
-6.0
5.4
-7.2
1.7
6.8
-14.5
-2.6
14.6
-8.1
2.0
19.5
2.2
9.6
17.5
2.7
8.4
14.7
Notes:
1 Wage changes are measured relative to that for all white males2 Wage changes as a result of employment shifts across 45
two-digit SIC industries
3 Wage changes within industries
Secular wage growth
Source: Murphy, 1989 NBER Labor Studies Conference mimeo; based
on March 1980 and 1987 C.P.S. Annual Demographic Supplements.
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TABLE 9
VOCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS IN MANUFACTURING:
BRITAIN (1974 - 78) AND GERMANY (1978)
Persons with stated qualifica-
Employment in tion levels as percentage of
each industry labour force in each industrial
Industrial as percentage group
group of total economy
Univ. Intermediatel None2
All mfg B 31.8 3.3 28.7 68.0
G 33.8 3.5 60.8 35.7
Food, drink,
tobacco B 3.0 2.0 21.2 76.8
G 2.5 1.7 60.1 38.2
Petro ProdB 0.2 6.0 39.8 54.1
G 0.1 6.5 72.2 21.4
Chem B 1.8 9.1 28.5 62.4
G 2.4 7.5 62.5 30.0
Metal Mfr B 1.8 2.7 27.0 70.3
G 2.0 2.3 61.2 36.5
Engineering,
vehicles
and metal-
working B 14.9 3.8 34.0 62.2
trades G 16.7 4.4 63.4 32.2
Textiles B 1.9 2.0 17.9 80.2
G 1.9 1.6 47.5 50.9
Leather B 0.2 0.0 17.2 82.8
G 0.2 0.8 49.1 50.1
Clothing
and
footwear B 1.9 1.1 15.0 83.9
G 1.3 0.9 51.0 48.1
Bricks
pottery,
etc B 1.1 2.5 21.1 76.4
G 1.1 1.8 55.9 42.3
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TABLE 9 (continued)
VOCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS IN MANUFACTURING:
BRITAIN (1974 - 78) AND GERMANY (1978)
Persons with stated qualifica-
Employment in tion levels as percentage of
each industry labour force in each industrial
Industrial as percentage group
group of total economy
Univ. Intermediatel None2
Timber
furniture,
etc B 1.1 0.9 32.7 66.3
G 2.1 0.9 62.0 37.1
Paper and
printing B 2.4 3.3 33.3 63.4
G 2.0 3.2 63.5 33.3
Other mfr B 1.6 2.2 20.8 77.0
G 1.3 2.5 53.9 43.6
Notes:
1 In Britain, includes both time-served and non-examined
apprenticeships.
2 For Britain, this group consists mainly (82Z) of those
reporting no vocational qualification; others have lower, but
non-vocational qualification. For Germany, this group consists
mainly of those who have not taken or have failed, the apprentice-
ship final examinations.
Source: Prais (1981a); from General Household Survey, 1974 - 78 in Britain,
and Microzensus, 1978 in Germany.
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TABLE 10
NUMBERS RECEIVING CRAFT QUALIFICATIONS
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES:
BRITAIN (1979) AND GERMANY (1977)
(thousands)
Industry Britain I  Germany2
Food and drink 0.6 7.2
Chemicals 0.4 5.2
Metals and mechanical engineering 22.9 47.5
Instrument engineering 0.6 3.9
Electricians and electrical
engineering 15.8 35.4
Vehicles 14.9 24.8
Textiles, clothing,
leather & footwear 2.2 7.9
Timber, furniture 3.3 10.0
Paper and printing 1.2 3.6
Other manufacture 0.1 0.7
Total manufacturing 62.1 146.3
Notes:
IBritain: City and Guilds Part II awards;
2Germany: Berufsschule final examinations.
Source: Prais (1981a)
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TABLE 11
EMPLOYMENT SHARES BY SKILL GROUP
IN GERMAN INDUSTRY
1960-87
(Z of total production employment)
SKILL GROUPS1
Industry 1 2 3
Machinery
1960
1969
1978
1982
1985
1987
Elec. Mach
1960
1969
1978
1982
1985
1987
Metal Working
1960
1969
1978
1982
1985
1987
Notes:
1 Skill groups are defined as follows:
1) apprenticeship certification or equivalent
2) less than apprenticeship certification but more
than six months training
3) six months or less training
Source: Statistiches Bundesamt, Fachserie 16, Riehle 2.1,
various years
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TABLE 12
EMPLOYMENT SHARES
UNITED KINGDOM
1973-85
Year Mechanical Eng. Elec. Eng. Vehicles
S/P M/T S/T S/P M/T S/T S/P M/T S/T
1973 .60 .32 .35 .28 .33 .17 .45 .26 .30
1974 .58 .33 .34 .28 .32 .17 .45 .26 .30
1975 .59 .33 .35 .32 .35 .19 .46 .27 .30
1976 .59 .33 .35 .32 .34 .19 .45 .27 .30
1977 .58 .34 .34 .31 .34 .19 .46 .26 .31
1978 .60 .34 .35 .31 .35 .19 .46 .26 .30
1979 .59 .34 .35 .32 .35 .19 .46 .26 .31
1980 .45 .33 .30 .23 .40 .14 .34 .29 .24
1981 .48 .35 .31 .25 .42 .14 .37 .30 .26
1982 .47 .38 .29 .25 .41 .15 .39 .31 .26
1983 .48 .35 .31 .24 .41 .14 .39 .32 .27
1984 .48 .35 .31 .25 .41 .15 .40 .32 .27
1985 .48 .35 .31 .24 .42 .14 .40 .32 .27
1987 .47 .35 .31 .24 .43 .14 .40 .34 .26
Note:
S/P - Craftsmen in occupations normally entered by apprenticeship
or equivalent training, divided by total production employment;
M/T - Managerial, administrative, technical and clerical occupations,
divided by total employment;
S/T - as above, except total employment is the denominator.
Source: Department of Employment Gazette, various issues.
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TABLE 13
RELATIVE WAGES BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP FOR BRITISH
MALE MANUAL WORKERS SELECTED INDUSTRIES
1974-80
Year Engineering Shipbuilding & Chemicals
Marine Engineering
S/SS S/L S/SS S/L C/GW
1974 1.09 1.39
1975 1.08 1.33 1.22 1.07 1.05
1976 1.07 1.30 1.19 1.06 1.06
1977 1.07 1.31 1.22 1.08 1.05
1978 1.08 1.31 1.22 1.08 1.06
1979 1.11 1.31 1.20 1.07 1.07
1980 1.12 1.32 1.19 1.06 1.07
Note: Occupational groups as defined in Table 15, except for
chemicals where GW = general workers = SS + L. Engineering
includes mechanical and electrical engineering, shipbuilding,
vehicles and metal goods n.e.c.
Source: Department of Employment Gazette, Table 5.5, July 1981.
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TABLE 14
RELATIVE WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT SHARES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Data from the New Earnings Survey
Occupational Group 1976 1979 1985 1987
Mechanical Engineering
Relative Wages
14115
14/17
Employment
Total (1976=1)
14/15
14/17
Electrical Engineerin&
Relative Wages
14/15
14/15.1
14/17
Employment
Total (1976=1)
14/15
14/15.1
14/17
Vehicles
Relative Wages
14/15
14/15.1
14/17
Employment
Total (1977-1)
14/15
14/15.1
14/17
1.02
1.39
1.0
6.19
6.15
1.04
1.12
1.18
1.0
2.55
9.9
4.67
1.02
1.03
1.12
1.0
3.49
11.97
6.67
1.03 1.01
1.17 1.16
.97
5.79
6.19
1.04
1.15
1.18
1.01
2.54
7.9
4.50
1.03
1.08
1.12
1.01
3.41
10.96
7.07
.94
6.59
7.95
1.13
1.20
1.24
.89
3.16
7.6
5.55
1.01
1.07
1.13
.78
3.45
14.0
6.14
Notes:
Relative wages are ratios of group medians;
14 - Processing, Making, Repairing and Related (Metal and
15 - Painting, Repetitive Assembling, Product Inspecting,
Packaging and Related;
15.1 - Repetitive Assembling, a component of group 15;
17 - Transport Operating, Materials Moving and Storing and
Related.
Electrical);
Source: New Earnings Survey, Section D, 1976, 1979, 1985, 1987;
Department of Employment Gazette, Table 1.3, various issues, for total
employment by industrty.
1.04
1.16
.87
6.31
7.99
1.11
1.24
1.20
.75
2.93
7.3
5.78
1.02
1.04
1.17
.67
3.49
12.59
6.24
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TABLE 15
EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATION IN THE MOTOR VEHICLES
AND PARTS INDUSTRY, 1978-84
Occupation 1978 1981 1984
z z z
managerial staff
scientists and
technologists
technicians and
draughtsmen
administration and
professional staff
clerks, office machine
operators, secretaries,
and typists
supervisors and
foremen
craftsmen
operators
others
numbers
2.7
0.6
4.3
4.3
7.1
4.8
14.1
36.0
26.1
}62.1
448,466
3.9
1.0
5.2
5.2
7.0
5.0
15.7
37.2
19.9
339,632
4.7
1.1
5.8
6.2
6.2
4.8
15.8
}57.1 55.5
261,415
Source: Marsden et. al. (1985) Table 6; from EITB, Sector
Profile, Motor Vehicles and Parts Manufacturing, April, 1984.
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TABLE 16
EMPLOYMENT AND SHARES BY OCCUPATION 1 IN THE
MOTOR VEHICLES AND PARTS INDUSTRY: 1971 AND 19812
Occupation 1971 1981
(percent)
manual 80.2 76.0
non-manual 19.4 23.5
managers 2.5 3.7
personnel management, work study 0.6 0.5
mechanical engineers 0.8 1.4
engineers not elsewhere classified
and technologists 0.5 2.1
electrical and electronic engineers 0.1 0.1
draughtsmen 1.3 0.9
laboratory assistants and technicians 1.5 0.7
clerks 6.7 5.4
typists, office machine operators 2.8 2.4
foremen 2.5
apprentices 0.8 3.4
electricians 1.3 1.9
toolmakers 2.3 2.4
sheet metal workers 2.0 1.8
plumbers and pipe fitters 0.3 0.4
welders 3.2 3.4
motor mechanics 1.0 1.8
fitters (maintenance and
not elsewhere classified) 7.4 5.9
machine tool setters,
operators, turners 14.9 12.8
press, stamp operators, etc. 2.0 0.4
inspectors 4.9
packers, bottlers 0.8 5.9
repetitive assemblers, etc. 10.5 7.3
labourers 5.2 3.1
security 0.6 0.7
catering 0.6 0.4
X in matched occupations 77.5 70.2
Notes:
1 The occupations shown are those which could be matched between 1971
and 1981.
2 Numbers employed in 1979 in SIC (1968:381) were 482,500, and in SIC
(1980:35) 491,200 . SIC (1968:381) includes gears and transmission
equipment (SIC 1980:326). Source: Census of Production 1979.
Source: Marsden et. al. (1985), Table 7; from UK Census of Population
1971 and 1981, 1971 SIC (1968:387); 1981 SIC (1980:35) motor vehicles
and parts.
154
TABLE 17
INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE RATIOS
(mean for 1974-84 minus mean for 1958-73)
Industry Difference
Food
Textiles
Apparel
Lumber
Furniture
Paper
Printing & Publishing
Chemicals
Petroleum
Rubber
Leather
Stone, Clay & Glass
Primary Metals
Fabricated Metals
Machinery
Electrical Machinery
Transport Equipment
Instruments
"LI,
5i
.~-4-; 7rbFL~~-4;r
i'r-
· ··'":
~~ .~·
:·,
· ··- · -
:,;;?ts- i':~ :
~~:···.;· ··
,·-~~:·
~a, i··
-.-i
~.
31'·'
.a·. ~·-:
;i ·
· ··
-----
.035
.192
-.219
.267
-.085
.214
.176
.124
-.309
.148
-.089
-.008
-.041
.242
.183
.257
.251
.133
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Commodity Exports
and Imports as Related to Output, Vols. 64, 65, 71, 72, 84 and 85.
to
OHS·
Wat,
_ __ I
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TABLE 18
INDUSTRY RANKINGS
Intra-industry Trade and the Shift to Skilled Workers
Ranking of Industries
Intra-industry Trade Shift to Skilled Production Workers
Lumber
Electrical Machinery
Transport Equipment
Fabricated Metals
Paper
Textiles
Machinery
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
Printing
Rubber
Instruments
Chemicals
Food
Stone, Clay and Glass
Primary Metals
Furniture
Leather
Apparel
Petroleum
Petroleum
Paper
Transport Equipment
Fabricated Metals
Textiles
Machinery
Lumber
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
Stone, Clay and Glass
Chemicals
Apparel
Rubber
Electrical Machinery
Food
Furniture
Instruments
Printing
Leather
Primary Metals
Note: The miscellaneous and tobacco
both rankings.
industries were excluded from
Source: see Table 17, and author's calculations from May CPS data.
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TABLE 19
ORDER BACKLOGS ANE FINISHED GOODS INVENTORIES
Industry Distributions and Means
Industry Full Sample FIFO Sample
Share Mean(OB/FGI) Share Mean(OB/FGI)
Food 1.1 1.8 0.4 0.8
Textiles 4.0 1.9 2.6 3.0
Apparel 4.1 1.8 6.0 1.8
Lumber 0.5 1.2 0.7 0.8
Furniture 1.9 3.2 1.9 3.0
Paper 1.0 1.1 - -
Printing 1.2 1.7 1.0 3.3
Chemicals 2.6 1.3 3.0 1.1
Petroleum 0.3 5.1 0.5 8.5
Rubber 2.5 2.9 2.2 7.3
Leather 1.8 3.9 1.5 5.3
Stone, Clay
& Glass 0.8 3.5 1.1 5.1
Primary Metals 3.2 3.7 1.2 2.4
Fabricated
Metals 10.6 4.1 7.2 4.2
Machinery 12.1 3.1 10.8 2.8
Electrical
Machinery 32.8 7.7 37.6 8.7
Transporta-
tion Equip 8.8 7.6 10.5 5.4
Instruments 8.1 4.1 8.5 3.6
Miscellaneous 2.3 2.3 3.4 2.2
100 100
DURABLES .81 .83
NONDURABLES .19 .17
Source: Compustat tapes and authors calculations.
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TABLE 20
ROGRESSION RESULTS: ORDER BACKLOGS AND FINISHED GOODS INVENTORIES
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Coefficient Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
.331 - -.2 -.34 1.43 -.81
(1.5) (.3) (.5) (4.2) (1.6)
j31*TIME .017 .011 .016 .009 .020 .020
(2.95) (2.9) (2.4) (1.2) (2.7) (2.5)
12*TBILL1 .001 .007 .010 .012 .008 .003
(0.0) (1.1) (0.7) (0.7) (0.5) (0.2)
A3*d(CPI) .028 .021 .028 .019 .033 .036(3.0) (4.1) (2.4) (1.3) (2.6) (2.6)
34*UR -.011 -.017 -.018 -.022 .018 .019(0.6) (1.7) (-0.8) (-0.9) (0.7) (0.7)
P5*IVM .009 .020(0.4) (1.4)
P6*IVM2  -.001 -.002
(0.5) (1.4)
N 4501 4501 3161 2377 2570 2178
where:
TIME=time trend
TBILL1-one-year Treasury Note rate
d(CPI)=annual change in the CPI
IVM-equals one in year of accounting change, and equals 1+n in nth year
after change.
samples:
(1) full sample
(2) full sample, fixed effects
(3) excludes observations after change in accounting method
(4) excludes firm if ever change accounting methods
(5) FIFO observations only
(6) FIFO only, excluding any observations after a change in accounting
methods
Note: -.coefficients on industry dummies are suppressed
Source: Compustat and author's calculations.
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TABLE 21
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Coefficient Full Sample FIFO Sample
Durables Nondurables Durables Nondurables
a 1.46 -.154 1.21 -.365
(10.1) (0.6) (5.9) (1.0)
31*TIME .011 .041 .017 .047
(1.6) (3.5) (1.8) (2.6)
32*TBILL1 .010 -.035 .016 -.097(0.7) (1.3) (0.8) (2.4)
33*d(CPI) .022 .053 .024 .111(2.0) (2.6) (1.4) (3.7)
04*UR -.022 .052 .001 .132(1.0) (1.3) (0.0) (2.3)
3659 842 1805 373
mean(OB/FGI) 5.21 1.98 5.35 2.52
PRODUCTION TO ORDER AND SKILLED WORKERS
Top Industries1
Increase in (OB/FGI). Shift to Skilled
FIFO Only Sample Production Workers
Leather Petroleum
Textiles Paper2
Transport Equipment Transport Equipment
Fabricated Metals Fabricated Metals
Textiles
Machinery
Notes:
1Industries with a significant positive coefficient on the time trend in
industry by industry regressions using the respective models.
2The FIFO data does not include any paper industry firms.
Source: Compustat and author's calculations.
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Appendix A
List of Occupations:
elw Barnings Survey of the U.K.
The occupations are arranged in 18 main groups. Those in groups I to IX
are classified as non-manual vith six exceptions, marked with an gas in
groups VII, VIII and IX. These six and all occupations in groups X to
XVIII are classified as manual.
Po t - MANAG IAL IENERAL MANAGEMENT)
p mmnIgera- notione goarran ann ota non-trade orgernatons
Genral ntral. deorw maraOerRs- rj~oN•lmar
GRoP N - PROFSSIONAL ANID REL APORTING M NAGEMENT AND
Judg. brrater. svocatss and wo
Town lerks arnd other rk to local authortRes
scirelam oftrade aocat• trade urions. prM onI bodies anor charite
EsWators. valers and ansIeors
FIrince. veasiment. insuraince and ia xpaceless
Praormo and • •dutral ratrs officers and managers
Orgrnateln S maethods work study and operateon reaserch offcers
Economsts. satimsicansr actnd usn
Sytemsrna uly and compuer progomris
hMnrkm0 ai Wes maraeas aid e•lscut"
Aderwmrg and publc retsots marNaers ari eacudrie
Pwcurln offcers and b iers
roper•y ad stae monagers
Latrw s aid infomatin officars
hr ItuoAry ararie mr pectors
Geeral aenmiratators- local goverarrent
A othlr profe •nol anrd roolte s• p•ortn managemen and sadm tration
GRUP i - PO FEISONAL AND RELATED I EDUCATIONWELFARE AND
HEALTH
U rsIIty cIdnaec slftleaIs rsa a srtaherian for furthert and rgrer education
Secodry uteachrsPrimary tears
I Spacer educatan teache
catelvdustral trasiers
rectrs ofo 0ducaton.oducatsn ofrcars, school -spctors
Socal and betvmurValcent
e ear - sca. rne cu. aidtrel aducatfra and mora
lor.wmtews of roon
W .n~ oerso
Nm u rsmtiretra and nurse eacuites
suntat ered and e snrde nurass an statartrod midwr
Nlur fng dui0es aid sasialnts
Pharmaists
Medcl eroarars an l
pame" thera pa
Chsropdes
M oter prossaor and r elated n educaton. welfare snd health
GROP IV - LITEARY.ARTISTIC AND SPORTS
Journemrs
Anrl coromercad artaf
IndustrialAde,
Actors. muscaserner. taier. sage meuagersIPhotWogpWeWdcamsc amen
Sound and vyn g m r opeaters
Protesa spotesamn. orts officab
A otler r.ar rtic and moiats enP,'ng authors and wrows
rDIP V - PMOFESSIOAL AND RELATED IN SCIENCE.ENGINEERING,.
TECHNOLOGY AND IMILAR FIELDS
kaoea Ieeftsi ae bochrn•ats
Car. U trctural muxncc gnoreer
Electric ngnrs
ectco ec neVrs o
Production neews
Plnai and qur orntro enaeers
MrIp. unrryme end dro inrrpnws
AerornewStca lners
ChimtN saie p r pr
MartwW ard 4r1wtg anerarsGeOraland othergmrsr
U 4e1r te&tnoog s
Archnectural daugteen
Erfpweroig aridothe @rsuglarnen
Laboratory echnIeCs - scrntei oand mndc4al
Engemerg chnerns and secancen leers
Arcrltcts and town plnners
Town annaig smItamossnwetwum and mbrug lWQscls
Qmnriy surveyorsAdeg land s&i anw mig asvrs
Arcrtaft •t et dck offcer
Ar trnaffi¢ Iarr snd onemrs
S ' rommasers. eck officers
Shps engeers offersSah•$ rs offcM
AN otr prol nd a=e@d enc eaead ain oend @41w oge aniuid gaerfIa
GROUP VI -MANAGEIAL EMCLU IN OENERAL MANAGEMENT)
Productan maugera.wMrht maagers.works Ormen
Engrierig marhneare Nmregars
SIo ad hr maIrIIers.a t.cIk o orkagererer toramen a oing arnd car
Miaagers --derroui mawog and pubic Mles
Trarapon mvunager -* ar .ag rroad. erbour
Mianger --earafva asd nmeatels ftnd•g
O{ s n .er ge.rs- strm g -
Offce magrs - tan gorrnen
Uhnger•s- gpmrtmnld sors.• arey class iore t armnerke ard dmarlonemo maragersbrnch magers of mop er Iran above
Maragersorf a ;sd ~ipdnt o  tgnploe)
Hotel anid redelgal ch rneragers
Pubicanr tampoeeal
Catrsig ands nroraemadl c* bmrager
Entearsnmment and i mo agers
Farm maneggra (eplYag)
Poe offceIr tspectors; above)
Fe siervce offices
Parin offces (cheal oces and above)
A other maragers
OROUP Vn - CLERICAL ANDRELATED
Suerveors of cerks
Costag anO accountg clks
Cash rurng clrk
Prnoco r endmatera o Murongs Coerks
Shmpng arnd tra av•nprll Vks
RAcoros and trary Cl•rks
ROW Shop cash
ecep• anros s r a i h
Suervsos of ltyit
per" iecrete shortlei r w 40 sa ice tleOlear t typet
Superves or *fce mSecal opeltors
Accoutmes and caickUlstw mecwe operstors
Key punch operators
AutomnatC data procaO-n eqmen opaereors
Once macrame oopeors not sratdried whrr
Supervars of telephonlas o r s rg ph operators
-s
R•to and tolerp omperaes
m Supervors of popmen .m sortrs ando mai nge
m Potmn.rmae arters ain mmsengers
OROUP VW SELLUG
Sales sWervlers
SOlmarMa santer. Mop s ants. rid els fers
nm Patrol utrmpno rtst mend nts
m flosdomel n ans van Yularen
Sal representtMwe (tlsee goode
Other ala irepre and agents
GROUP IX - SECUITY AND PUOTCEVL IVESVIC
Superveors poice esgeasfee fr1`0 g a1id rntFO
Poweraen Melown ,srg a
Preon offcers belowS prepel officear
Securoty offers and aet
m SecIKWy gurd p tr
Traffc. mwrdns
m oter$ n sescurty aid proactre serves
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Groups X to XVIII: manual. A few occupations, prefixed with letter nm " in groups VII, V
and IX are also classified as manual
inouP x -CATEIUNO,CLEANNm HA RESSING AND OTHER
PERSOeNAL SERICE
Colring rweora
Chin oo•
Wrms. wealtraes
arman bartmmna
Counr mhandr aimlants
K*tchan portarahands
Supervoors -housekepirg and relatedI parveoratoreren - caretaking ceosn and related
DomNIc housekespes
Norma ind daomec hlours. mends
School helrs arid chool superveory usstnts
Trvel stMewards and attendants
Anbancemnn
spltalwar OrdarIorrs
o*4ws portersNoas pan..
Caretaker$
oad woeapers (msnual)
Otherl clenersOmn. ationmns
Lit and car park attendants
Garmel prm er
M •bdraep aerveors
Maamrs
AD other m catming. wirgrodrearnd other personal rvceawI - AMinim AND M At-ED
Farmllen - trning rtcumtur forentry
Garnatlaimn woiwsa
pigand poDUrymenw
Nornrmnral worrs
D ac gardenonrwate pardem)
Norslobid t gardwr and qrounamen
Ar wu rawocnery awrtsoperators
Far.ery workr
rvormatmnte (famo)
-Al" olr n -. f- rg and relatedG DhOU Xr - ter PROCESSm (ECLUIMdn M ETAL)
.. W*da. rtmcl. chmreatlso d.rak ard tokaco, wood. pape and Doard rubber
aid pMas)Prane• t - sertey prodrctmn workers
lbwry producstn wories
Forean - etl procarmng
Preparatory Wfe proceaors
futraldourora s om
Wagrp , ers
iealcs. uers and finrm
ftera-an " g rurs amrrsremmr- caras poceed mClmt•=. sar on petrourn procees im operaors
1rG ooom drk km (h
Flour anmINct•r
uJt idn *o meat ma• sFoIoam- parn anrd board ma ng
moatum s reamerten- paper and board rakingt Mectwnen. arrmen. caridare aer . n ma - paper and board making
For - poct Og - g o. ceram Ar.nbar rid plastes tc
Gtma and crami furrtcnar and kUsa nKin atleS
agicattrg mOtvan - runbbr ard pgast•
Aftlbr mow ad conpourndars
Caonr and estrudang macne operators- rub•r and pleasIs
Marn-mae fba mekars
Sewage pba attendents
A oher in moteral procewga (other tian meat)
GROUP XM - MAKING AND EPAIRING (ENCUDING METAL AND
ELECTRICAL)
iGlass ceramcs. prting paper products clthing lotwaar woodwork"ng .ra er iastcs)
Foremen -* aso workang
Gssu formers and shpes
Gass frshors and decorators
Forema• - clay and stotre orking
SCastos and other pottery makers
Cutters shapers and po ers - Mone
Foremen -printng
Foremen - paer products mkaing
Foremen - bookbinoing
Compostors
Electrotypers stereotypers
Other prnting plste and cywder preparers
Printing machine mners (etterpressi
Prlnting machine minders (hthogrhy)
Prlting mecrne mnders (photogravure)
Printng machne asstants (lattrpess tahography and photogravure)
Screen and block printers
Bookbiners and tfihers
Cutting and tteng machine operators per an papen r products making)
Foreman - texfde materis workrng
Bespoke taiors ano teaoresaes
DIessmakers
C3ot0h cutters ain makers mejn ure)
Othe1 Clothng cutters end makers
SCoach treimmers
UDhoMerer mattress mno er
Han Isewers and embroeorers
Likers
Sewng machnrsts (teliet materies)
Foremen - aother and • ther substiaulte working
Boot and shoe makers (D lbespoketl and repaiers
Leather and IWther substitutes Cutters
Footwear asters
Leather ard iather substtutes sewers
Foo(tr indrters
Foremen - wood workng
Carpenters and oerst (Constructen gtes and maintnrance
Carpenters and joiaers (She arn stage)
Carpenters and joers tother)ICabinet maers
Case and bos makers
Wood sawyers and veneer cutters
Woodworkeng mach s (alsetters and setter overatorsi
Other woooworking machirm s (operators ania mOders)
Patterr skers (tmouI1s
Labourers and mates to woodworking Craftsmen
Foremen - ruber and lastics workng
Tyre baders
Mouldng mactr operatorsatterinat (rubber and plastcs)
Deta mecromcs
As other in makng arnd reparing tesclu r metal and electrcal)
ROUP XIV - PROCESSINMAK IN EPAIRIN AND IELATED (METAL
AND ELECTRICAL)
(on. teel and other metals ern0ersng ( hg mtatn at d ma aeance
,-emles and hebupbnM
Forem - metal makng and treating
Furnsmn (steer m )elteOther furrecemen - metal
Roeermn (stal
MoMiders aid mouridroremakers
SMachne moulders e o motds rand m •chte coremakeors
Die casters
DM taw ewra
rnthsa.orgemen
Eactraeaters .
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l XIVN - PROCESs.MAKINGM I R ING AND RELATED (METAL
AuDP ELECTICAL) - ,weu•ti
ars .l dare.d l.heu wterS (nImel)
Foremn - enrmere maclmpg
Prm anrnd machine 1t 1mlers
met turners vo ginders
Otr l Cere lthe turnersW too amlttor"rOW&oS
c too operators inot sttin up)
Press a stamsn g machrne operators
AutoIe nt I a attendantsimanders
Meaul pow
Foremen - product• n flitig (metar)
Tomaakers. tool fIrsI markers Out
precin fitrumgrnt makers
Metal working production fters (fire arims)
Metao workang prodcton fitter-machtnets* (fire rists)
Other metal working production titters - (not to rine mnits)
Foremen - ruatlsaten and mnterlance - rachols and instruments
Machnery erectors arid nasters
Mkarintorlaln ftters - non-lectrca! plnt and dnustril machinery
Ktttmig mechne mechanrcs (ndustrel)
Molor elw m•chlInca (skidO)
Other motor vh rec• ic
Me•ntence e nd rvc fitters - arcraft eng•res
WmCh anid clock rpM$sr
Offcemacrhn ery mechanes
Foren - producton ftng and warng ( lectrcauliectroni
Producton faters - electrcaselectron0r
Productin elctriciren
Fore n -en laon and momntenance teiectrr ctron,
Enctrcere - stealstoon and maritenance (plart and machinery)
Electrcans- mstaleton and mantenance premeesishrps)
Telephone itters
ROde television and other electroric mainternce itters and mechancs
Cable pointers and aismeni n
Foremenrraperveor- metal working - ipes snets structures
Pmbers. ee fitters
Netig rand venidltreg rgoeermig fitters
Gas tars
Sheet metal workers
Plates arid et0l stupwrilghts
Caulker Dur. r•ters anrd iaer (costructr n metal)
General stel workers- srpb-ng anrid repot
Steol erectors
Scaffolders stagers
Sltea bndersber benders and fleers
Walders - skied
Other welOer
Foremen- other proces making and repaang (met•r and electrcall
Gasnmathse revramit and precious artne workers
Engravers and tcer (prntg)
Coach and wale body bwidersmakers
Arcraft fiaseers
Maintenance and i•talation fitters - nechancal iand aectrical
Stter operators Of w• working and n mtal working machines
AN Other skied an processing making and reparing (tnmtal an o lectrcal
AN other nansked in procesoag makng aid repaing (meta arnd lectrical
SROUP XV - PANTING REPETIIVE ASEMLJNG. PRODUCT INSPECTING,
PACKAGING AND RELATED
Foremen - painting and wnaer coating
pinters arnd decorators
Pottery decorators
Coach pasitera
Other spray psntersFrench poseers
Foremen -pr uasemtOeg Iapetirte)
Foremen- product ispecton
Repetine assemblers (metal and electrical goods)
pectors ai teeters (skied)- metei and ealctrae enOeereg
VlOmS - mete arida ectrial enmg m
Foremen -OKAeg
P sobottlers. canrs Iais
As otar n pano repet asuenmbag. proct eectg paIckaIn and reated
GROUP XVI - CONSTRUCTION, MINING AND RELATED NOT ENTFIED
ELSEWHERE
Foremen- buip andr cod ngeer-ng not interd lhere
Bicklayers
Faier- ng masonsPsasgieis
Flora an wall tai terrazzo worlars
RootrS and eors
Radway trackmen and platelGy s
Asphal and bitumen rome asurcert
Other roearen
Concret erectorsassemlers
Concrete leveerrssceseaers
General buiders
Sewermen (mantenancel
Maras ond srvce layers and poe owinters (draiage gs od water)
Waste repetors (Wter supply)
Cralftmen a mates and other budr•s labourers not deonrldld edsewhere
Can erp ar g labourers
Formrvedeutes - coamrng
Face-trained coan g workers
Tunne•mrs
Al oter in ortructon. m ing quarrying is l dring and related not
doeied elswhere
GROUP XVI- TRANSPORT OPERATING MATERIALS MOVING AND
STORIN 0AND RELATED
Foremen- aps. sghters and other veasel
Foremen- mr transport operating
Formen - road transport operating
Deck and engre room hands (sea-goingt
Bargemaen hgtermen boatmen tugmen
Locomotie drers motormen
Secornen trawaiys)
Ranway pard
Ratw-ay ugnmen and shlunters
Bus rapectors
Bus and coach drives
Heaevy goods 0 ers •ower 3 tons urdlden eW0t)
Other oos drivers
Other motor rvers
Bus conbictors
Drawers rmates
Fornmn - cna engneer ng olant oprating
Mechncal plant dr•Versoperators - earth-movng and ard enteewMvig
Foremen- materel s handng eoqument opertong
Crane mersoperators
Fork Mt arid othe rMechanical truck rverrOpgerators
Foremen- materlals mong and storng
Storekeepers warehousemen
Stevedores and dockers
Furniure removers
Warehone market and Other goods porters
Refuse colbctorsrdustren
AS other in transport operatng •tetras movn and stmorng and relted not dernttel
sewmnere
GROUP XVn - MISCELLANEOUS
Foremn- mecaomneous
Electricay poer pant operstors and sw4cr oard atteIndmrts
Turncocks (wester suppy)SGenera labour s - engwneerig rand s•hebuihang
Other gnral labourers
Al otter in mecetneous occupetieo ns not a• ted elswhere
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